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We discuss a class of markets for durable goods where eﬃciency (or approximate eﬃciency) is
obtained despite the presence of information asymmetries. In the model, the number of times
a good has changed hands (the vintage of the good) is an accurate signal of its quality, each
consumer self-selects into obtaining the vintage that the social planner would have assigned to
her, and consumers’ equilibrium trading behavior in secondary markets is not subject to adverse
selection. We show that producers have the incentive to choose contracts that lead to the eﬃcient
allocation, and to supply the eﬃcient output. We also provide a contrast between leasing contracts,
resale contracts, and diﬀerent kinds of rental contracts. Resale contracts do not lead to the eﬃcient
allocation. A speciﬁc kind of rental contract provides the appropriate incentives to consumers.1 Introduction
Since Akerlof’s (1970) seminal paper, adverse selection has been recognized to be a potential source
of ineﬃciency in durable-goods markets. The present paper suggests that asymmetric information
leads to ineﬃciency in standard adverse-selection models only under speciﬁc restrictions about
trading opportunities. If those restrictions are removed, full information payoﬀs and allocations
can be achieved in a competitive equilibrium even under asymmetric information.
We depart from the literature in three key ways. First, we do not study secondary markets in
isolation. Secondary markets interact in important ways with the market for new goods; we take
these interactions into account by integrating the markets for new units (including production) into
the analysis. Second, we remove some restrictions on secondary markets implicitly present in the
previous literature by allowing for unrestricted opportunities for retrading in frictionless secondary
markets (except for the presence of information asymmetries). Third, we do not restrict goods to
be oﬀered on the basis of selling (or leasing) contracts. We show that a menu of rental contracts is
eﬃcient and privately optimal for competitive producers.
To understand the contrast between our ﬁndings and standard ineﬃciency results, consider
the classic adverse selection environment (as, e.g., in Akerlof, 1970 and Wilson, 1980). Eﬃciency
requires allocating high quality cars to high valuation consumers. In Akerlof’s model, the used
cars are owned by low-valuation consumers, implying that trading is essential to achieve eﬃciency.
However, if car quality is privately known, then it is typically impossible to eﬀect such welfare-
improving trades in an incentive-compatible way. Ineﬃciency is thus a consequence of private
information. Some recent literature has pointed out two ways in which Akerlof’s model may be
incomplete as a model of durable goods. But, while both modiﬁcations of Akerlof’s model lead to
a reduction in the distortions caused by asymmetric information, ineﬃciencies still remain.
The ﬁrst departure from Akerlof, which has been pursued by Hendel and Lizzeri (1999, 2002)
and Johnson and Waldman (2003), explores the idea that, in the case of durable goods such as
cars, the identity of the owners of used goods is endogenous because consumers self-select into
either the new-goods or the used-goods market. Thus, in contrast with Akerlof, in these models,
the owners of used units are high-valuation consumers who chose to purchase new goods instead
of purchasing used units. These papers show that the interaction between the markets for new
and used units has important consequences, and that the distortions caused by adverse selection
in durable-goods markets may be less drastic than was suggested by Akerlof. However, in these
papers, ineﬃciencies due to adverse selection generally persist due to an implicit restriction on the
set of markets that can be open. This arises because goods are assumed to last two periods and
there is only one secondary market. Thus, while new goods tend to be allocated to those who value
them most, distortions persist in the allocation of used goods. With only one secondary market,
it is impossible to achieve sorting in the used-good market by allocating higher quality used goods
to higher valuation used-good consumers.1
1An exception that is explored by Hendel and Lizzeri and Johnson and Waldman is the case in which there are
only two types of consumers. In this case, only one type consumes used goods, so sorting in secondary markets is not
an issue. We will see below that another exception is the case of two qualities.
1The second departure from Akerlof, which has been explored by Janssen and Roy (2001, 2002),
retains the basic assumption of Akerlof’s model that used goods are exogenously allocated to low-
valuation consumers. They point out that, in the case of durables, it may be natural to allow
markets to be open repeatedly. Janssen and Roy show that, when used-goods markets are open
at every date, more welfare-enhancing trades are possible. Prices and traded qualities increase
over time, and the time to trade acts as a sorting device because owners of high quality cars are
more willing to wait to obtain the high prices. As in our paper, sorting takes place. However, the
equilibrium allocation is not eﬃcient in their model: the ineﬃciency takes the form of a delay of
trade. Furthermore, such ineﬃciency is inescapable: it cannot be eliminated by clever contract
design. This is because, in an environment in which ownership of goods is exogenous, there exists
no mechanism (static or dynamic) that achieve the ex-post eﬃcient allocation.
We show that removing both limitations of Akerlof’s model at the same time can lead to the
ﬁrst-best outcome, given the appropriate choice of contracts. Thus, the combination of multiple sec-
ondary markets and endogenous assignment of new goods can completely eliminate the ineﬃciencies
caused by asymmetric information. Endogeneity of new car consumers allocates the highest-value
cars to the right consumers, and the existence of multiple secondary markets allocates used units
to the right used-car consumers.
The basic intuition for this result emerges most starkly in an asymmetric-information environ-
ment we call the simple depreciation model. We assume that all new units of the durable good have
the same, known quality. However, goods depreciate stochastically: if the good is of quality qn at
date t, there is a positive probability that the good depreciates to quality qn+1 by date t+1. This
implies that a good produced some time in the past may be of several distinct qualities, numbered
0 (highest) through N (lowest). In a steady state, there is a distribution of qualities, with newly
produced goods replacing units that have depreciated. Smoothly functioning secondary markets
play two key roles in this environment: (1) they must allow high-valuation consumers whose units
have depreciated to replace them with new goods, transferring the used good to lower-valuation
consumers; (2) they must allocate used units eﬃciently among low-valuation consumers. If the
quality of the good is publicly observable, trade in secondary markets achieves these two goals
and leads to the eﬃcient allocation. If, on the other hand, a prospective buyer cannot observe
the quality of the good prior to purchase, adverse selection could in principle preclude eﬃciency,
because stochastic depreciation can potentially generate quality uncertainty in secondary markets.
However, we show that, even in the presence of these information asymmetries, there is a
competitive equilibrium in which a menu of rental contracts induces precisely the same allocation
that would prevail if quality were observable; furthermore, per-period rental rates are exactly the
same as under observable quality. In this equilibrium, all that consumers need to observe is the
vintage of a unit, i.e. the number of distinct consumers who have used it in the past. Thus, in
this model, as long as this limited amount of information about the trading history of a good is
available, asymmetric information about quality is completely harmless.2,3
2Note that this information is commonly available to used car consumers in the US through Carfax.
3Consider the following alternative assumptions: cars follow the depreciation process speciﬁed in the text, but a
used unit can only be traded once, t periods after it is produced. This yields a model that is very similar to the
2The equilibrium may be brieﬂy described as follows. Every vintage (including vintage 0, which
corresponds to new goods) is traded at a diﬀerent price. In each period, a high-valuation consumer
rents a new (vintage-0) unit, and stops renting that unit when it depreciates for the ﬁrst time. At
that point the vintage of the unit increases from zero to one. Consumers with somewhat lower
valuation rent a vintage-1 unit and keep renting it until the unit depreciates again, at which point
its vintage increases to 2, and is passed on to consumers with yet lower valuation. The process
continues until the good “falls apart and dies”. Consumers who stop renting a unit of vintage n
obtain another unit of the same vintage. Therefore, in equilibrium, the vintage of a unit is a perfect
signal of its quality: a good that has had n previous consumers is of quality qn. Note the contrast
with the idea discussed by Janssen and Roy. In their model, the time that the good is kept by its
original owner serves as a signal of quality. However, this is a costly signal; the ﬁrst-best allocation
involves immediate trade but, in the case of asymmetric information, the owner must keep the
good suﬃciently long in order to prove that the good is high quality. In our model, the signal
of quality is the number of previous consumers of the good, and this signal is not distortionary:
regardless of whether quality is observable or unobservable, the good changes hands precisely when
it depreciates. The time the good is held by a consumer is random in our model; it depends on
how quickly the good depreciates.
Rental contracts provide the right incentives to consumers; in particular, consumers have no
reason to keep renting a unit once that unit has depreciated: better units are available at the
same rental price. In contrast, a system of resale markets generates the wrong incentives: some
consumers ﬁnd it proﬁtable to keep a unit after it depreciates, so that its vintage is no longer a
perfect signal of its quality. The rough intuition is that, in a system of resale markets, consumers
suﬀer a capital loss when the good changes hands (and hence its vintage increases). This loss is
instead borne by the producer of the good when the good is rented. Thus, with rental contracts,
the consumer has no incentive to retain depreciated units.
Given that the desirable eﬃciency properties of rental contracts depend on transferring the
capital loss generated by a change in vintage from consumers to producers, it is important to
determine which contracts would be chosen by the producers of these goods. We show that there
is a competitive equilibrium in which the eﬃcient amount of output is produced and the eﬃcient
menu of rental contracts is chosen by each ﬁrm. Thus, ﬁrms are indeed willing to bear the capital
losses associated with changing vintages. It should however be emphasized that this result does
require that consumers be able to observe the contracts oﬀered by individual ﬁrms. This is a strong,
albeit standard, requirement which is consistent with the spirit of competitive equilibrium analysis.
Vintage is a particularly eﬀective signal of quality in the model just described because there is
no uncertainty about the quality of the new good (it is known to be q0), and depreciation occurs
only one step at a time (e.g. from qn to qn+1, but not to qn+k, for k > 1). In order to examine the
robustness of the intuition just described, we analyze a more general model that allows both for
ones studied by Hendel and Lizzeri and Johnson and Waldman: from the point of view of prospective consumers,
the quality of a unit oﬀered on the used-car market is a random variable with a distribution determined by the
depreciation rates. Under this interpretation, the only diﬀerence between our simple depreciation model and the
environments studied in the papers cited above is the number of active secondary markets for a given unit.
3initial uncertainty about the quality of newly produced goods, and for more general depreciation
processes. Again, eﬃciency involves assortative matching of qualities to consumers. The quality
of a unit is only observed by a consumer who has tried it in the past; thus, there is asymmetric
information in secondary markets. An important diﬀerence relative to the simple depreciation
model is that, in this more general model, in order to ﬁnd a good of the right quality, consumers
must experiment with diﬀerent units.
We show that it still possible to employ the vintage of the good to signal its quality and to
allocate it eﬃciently; however, in contrast with the simple depreciation model, sorting now occurs
with some delay. Each unit changes hands until it ﬁnds its right match, and the unit increases in
vintage each time it changes hands. In turn, a consumer continues experimenting with a particular
vintage until she gets the top quality of that vintage, and then keeps the unit until it depreciates. If
the car depreciated only one step, the next consumer to obtain that unit will hold on to it until the
next time it depreciates. If, on the other hand, the car depreciated k > 1 steps, the next consumer
to obtain that unit will immediately return it to try another car of the same vintage, while the car
is traded at least k times increasing in vintage with every trade (exactly k times if the car does
not depreciate while this process continues). Thus, as in the previous model, units “trickle down”
from consumers with high valuation to consumers with lower valuations.
We also show that, as under simple depreciation, a menu of rental contracts induces consumers
to follow an experimentation policy leading to the eﬃcient matching of goods to consumers.4
While full eﬃciency is achieved in the simple depreciation case, sorting occurs with delay in the
more general model, because experimentation is required. However, the utility cost of this delay
becomes negligible if retrading can happen quickly. Furthermore, the rental prices that induce
consumers to follow this experimentation policy converge to the observable-quality rental prices
when the time between transaction converges to zero. We show that, as a consequence, producers’
incentives are approximately in line with eﬃciency.
Our analysis of the general depreciation model highlights a new role for secondary markets
as vehicles for facilitating experimentation. Since experimentation is only necessary when quality
is not publicly observable, secondary markets are more active when quality is unobservable. To
elaborate, when quality is observable, trading in secondary markets takes place only when units
depreciate, and one transaction per depreciation event is enough to achieve sorting regardless of
whether depreciation occurs in one step or in multiple steps. In contrast, when quality is not
observable, multiple transactions per depreciation event are necessary to land the unit in the right
hands. This implies that the absence of impediments to frequent retrading such as transaction
costs can be more important in a world with private information about quality.
An implication of our model is that, if transactions involve rental contracts, observability of
the vintage of the good is welfare-improving. The role of the observability of trading histories in
the case of resale markets is less obvious. Indeed, House and Leahy (2001) provide a model in
which observability of trade histories can create additional distortions. In their setup, there are
4As in the simple depreciation model, resale markets generate the wrong incentives. Indeed, there is an additional
drawback of resale markets, because consumers incur a capital loss every time they experiment.
4two car qualities; consumers are homogeneous in their valuations for quality, but the match value
of a consumer/car pair deteriorates stochastically over time. Eﬃciency requires that the good
change hands every period; however, welfare is unaﬀected by the identity of used-good buyers,
because these all have the same valuation for quality, and the match value is idyosincratic. Thus,
conditional on the owner selling the good to some other agent, information about the quality of
the good cannot improve welfare; however, adverse selection does create a distortion, since owners
of good-quality units may refrain from trading. House and Leahy show that observability of trade
histories introduces an additional distortion, because owners of good cars may delay selling them
to signal that their car is high quality (as in Janssen and Roy).
In contrast, extensive numerical analysis of a three-quality version of our simple depreciation
model indicates that the allocation when the vintage of the good is observable is more eﬃcient
than in the case in which it is unobservable. This contrast may be explained by noting that gains
from trade stem from diﬀerent sources in the two models. In particular, in our model, consumers
are heterogeneous in their valuation for quality; as a consequence, eﬃciency does depend upon the
identity of the agents buying a used unit: it is eﬃcient to match high-quality used units to quality-
sensitive consumers. Since trade history is a signal of the quality of traded units, observability
enhances the buyer-car match.5
We should note that the goal of the paper is not to construct a realistic model of a durable-
goods market. Rather, our model is designed to enable us to evaluate the distortions caused by
adverse selection in the absence of any other friction in secondary markets. A more realistic model
would acknowledge the importance of frictions such as transaction costs. However, by assuming
away additional complications, we are able to isolate the role of informational asymmetries as a
barrier to the eﬃcient operation of secondary markets.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model
We consider a discrete-time, inﬁnite-horizon economy. Time is measured in some speciﬁed unit
(e.g. days, months, years), and every time period lasts for ∆ ∈ (0,1] units. There is a unit mass
of inﬁnitely lived consumers who diﬀer in their valuation for quality, characterized by a “type”
θ ∈ [θ,θ] ⊂ R+, distributed according to the c.d.f. F; the latter is assumed to have a strictly
positive density. The total mass of cars equals Y < 1; at any time, the quality of a car may take
up one of ﬁnitely many values, denoted q0 > q1 > ... > qN ≥ 0.
Consumers discount utility streams at the instantaneous rate ρ; thus, u utils at time t > 0
are worth e−ρtu utils at time 0. Car qualities and consumer valuations determine instantaneous
5Stolyarov (2002) develops a model of trade in secondary markets with transaction costs. He shows that the
probability of trade is non-monotonic in the age of the good. Tadelis (1999) develops an adverse-selection model
where the name of a ﬁrm summarizes its reputation. He shows that there is active trade in names, but there is no
equilibrium in which only good types buy good names. In his model, in contrast with ours, shifts in ownership are
not observable. Tadelis (2002) studies a related model where moral hazard is also considered.
5ﬂow utility from consumption, as follows: if a type-θ consumer drives a quality-q car for τ units of







Associating quality levels with instantaneous (as opposed to per-period) utility from consumption
simpliﬁes the comparison of consumption streams in economies characterized by periods of diﬀerent
length ∆. Finally, utility is quasi-linear in “money”. Speciﬁcally, for every Lebesgue-measurable
function q : R+ → {q0,...,qN} and every pair of sequences {Pk}k≥0,{tk}k≥0 in R+, the utility of
a type-θ consumer who, at each time t ∈ R+, drives a car of quality q(t) and eﬀects a (lump-sum)







Each period consumers receive an endowment e of ‘money’. We assume that e is ﬁnite and
‘large’, namely e is large enough that consumers can potentially aﬀord any quality they wish to
consume.6
In any period, a car may depreciate (i.e. its quality may deteriorate), or it may break down,
i.e. “die”, in which case it exits the economy and is replaced by a newly-produced car. We assume
throughout that the “death” of a car is publicly observable, regardless of whether or not quality
is. The probability of depreciation events is assumed to be linear in the length ∆ of periods;
thus, depreciations are less likely to occur in a short period of time. This linearity assumption
is immaterial as far as the results in Section 3 are concerned, and can be substantially relaxed
in the setting of Section 4. However, if depreciation probabilities are linear in ∆, the resulting
discrete-time depreciation process has a well-deﬁned and natural continuous-time limit, which we
brieﬂy describe below.
We analyze two models of the depreciation process. In the simple depreciation model, the
quality of a newly produced car is known to be q0. For n = 0,...,N − 1, at the end of each
period, a car currently of quality qn depreciates to qn+1 with probability γn∆; a quality-qN car
does not depreciate, but may die with probability γN∆ at the end of each period. It turns out that
the analysis is independent of the length ∆ of time periods, and hence of the speciﬁc functional
dependence of depreciation probabilities on ∆.
In the general depreciation model, for n = 0,...N, a newly produced car has quality qn with
probability χn ≥ 0, where
PN
n=0 χn = 1. Moreover, for n = 0,...,N and m = n + 1,...,N + 1, a
car of quality qn depreciates to qm (if n < m ≤ N) or dies (if m = N +1) with probability γn,m∆ in
every time period. The simple depreciation case corresponds to χ0 = 1 and γn,m = 0 for m > n+1.
Thus, there are two generalization relative to the simple depreciation model: (1) initial quality is
uncertain; (2) depreciation can occur in more than one step.
6The assumption that the endowment is large allows us to rule out equilibria with price ‘bubbles’, where resale
prices of a good escalate because consumers expect them to rise in the future. The assumption of a large endowment
is made to avoid keeping track of the wealth of each consumer. Such a problem would complicate the analysis, and
seems tangential to the issue studied here.
6It can be shown that, as ∆ → 0, the general depreciation process has a well-deﬁned continuous-
time limit, which may be (somewhat loosely) described as follows: if, at time t, car quality equals
qn, then (i) the time until the next depreciation event is exponentially distributed, with parameter PN+1






To avoid redundancies, we assume that the general depreciation process generates a positive
mass of cars of each quality level. Formally, for every n = 0,...,N, there is at least one sequence
m0 < ... < mM = n, with M ≥ 0, such that χm0 > 0 and γm`,m`+1 > 0 for all ` = 0,...,M − 1.
To clarify, for n = 0, this requires that newly produced cars attain the highest quality level q0 with
positive probability; for n = 1, it requires that either newly produced cars attain quality level q1
with positive probability, or that they attain quality level q0 with positive probability, and that
quality-q0 cars depreciate to q1 with positive probability; and so on.
2.2 Eﬃciency
We now deﬁne our reference notion of eﬃciency. At each time t ≥ 0, positive assortative matching
of consumer types to cars must obtain; thus, we need to determine cutoﬀ types θ∗
0, ...,θ∗
N ∈ [θ,θ]
such that types θ ∈ [θ∗
0,θ] hold a quality-q0 car, types θ1 ∈ [θ∗
1,θ∗
0) hold a quality-q1 car, and so
on; types θ < θ∗
N will not hold any car (recall that the mass Y of cars is less than 1, the mass of
consumers).
In order to determine these cutoﬀ types, we must ﬁrst derive the steady-state masses of cars
of each quality, as determined by the depreciation process. Let v∗
n denote the steady-state mass of
cars of quality qn. We consider the general speciﬁcation of the depreciation process, as it entails
only a slight penalty in terms of analytical complexity. Recall that ∆ denotes the lenght of a period
in terms of the chosen units of calendar time.
It is convenient to introduce the following notation. First, for all n = 0,...,N and m =
n+1,...,N +1, let Gn =
PN+1
`=n+1 γn,`, so Gn∆ is the probability that a quality-qn car depreciates
at all (or dies) in a period; we assume that Gn ≤ 1 for all n = 0,...,N. Next, denote by
γn,n(∆) the probability that a car of quality qn does not depreciate in a single period: that is,
γn,n(∆) = 1 − Gn∆.
For n = 0,...,N, the steady-state mass v∗
n must satisfy the following system of equations:
v∗
0 = γ0,0(∆)v∗
0 + χ0y∗ (1)
v∗
n = γn,n(∆)v∗















7That is: Y is the total mass of cars (equation 4) and y∗ is the mass of cars that die in each time
period, and are replaced by newly produced cars (equation 3). The mass of cars of quality q0 consists
of quality-q0 cars that have not depreciated in the previous period, and of newly-produced quality-
q0 cars (equation 1). Finally, the mass of quality-qn cars, for n > 0, is given by undepreciated
quality-qn cars, newly-produced quality-qn cars, and cars previously of higher quality that just
depreciated to qn (equation 2).
Straightforward manipulations7 show that the above system of equations admits a unique so-
lution, which is independent of ∆ (so our benchmark is unaﬀected by the duration of a period).
Furthermore, a simple induction argument shows that, under the assumption on the depreciation
process stated at the end of the preceding section, v∗
n > 0 for all n = 0,...,N.
The ex-post eﬃcient steady-state allocation of cars to consumers (“eﬃcient sorting” hereafter)
can then be described as follows. First, let θ−1 := θ; next, proceeding iteratively for n = 0,...,N,
assuming that θ∗
n−1 has been deﬁned, choose θ∗
n such that




observe that θ−1 > θ∗
0 > ... > θ∗
N by construction; also, θ∗
N > θ, because Y < 1.
Thus, for every n = 0,...,N, the mass of consumers with types θ ∈ [θ∗
n,θ∗
n−1] is equal to the




We are interested in analyzing the incentives of consumers and producers. For expository rea-
sons, it is convenient to focus on consumers’ incentives ﬁrst, assuming that production is exogenous,
and then extend the analysis to the supply side of the economy. Correspondingly, we distinguish be-
tween consumer equilibrium, which assumes exogenous production, and market equilibrium,
which encompasses ﬁrms’ optimal choice of output and contracts.
3 Simple Depreciation Model
3.1 Observable-Quality Benchmark and Trickle-Down
We begin by brieﬂy analyzing consumer equilibrium in the simple depreciation model, under the
assumption that quality is observable. This will serve as a benchmark, and also illustrate our
notation.
Regardless of whether cars are sold or rented, the following strategies constitute a consumer
equilibrium. Whenever consumers of type θ ∈ [θ∗
0,θ] do not have a car, they obtain a car of quality
q0 and keep it as long as the car remains of quality q0. As soon as the car depreciates to q1 they
get rid of the car and obtain a new car of quality q0. Consumers of type θ ∈ [θ∗
n,θ∗
n−1] behave in an
7For any y




N; furthermore, adding up Eqs. (1) and (2) and solving for
y
∗ shows that Eq. (3) is automatically satisﬁed. If y
∗ = 0 then v
∗
n = 0 for all n, and since χ0 > 0, there exists y
∗
such that Eq. (4) holds. Substituting for y
∗ in Eqs (1), it becomes apparent that the solution is independent of ∆.
8analogous fashion with cars of quality qn. Clearly, the resulting equilibrium allocation is ex-post
eﬃcient; moreover, this equilibrium allocation is essentially8 unique.
Under rental, a consumer who rents a car of quality qn pays a fee 1−e−ρ∆
ρ rn at the beginning of
the period (hence, if she keeps renting the same quality, she pays this fee at times 0,∆,2∆,...).
This can be seen as the discounted value of a constant, instantaneous rental price rn to be paid
throughout the period. Consequently, the per-period utility for a type-θ consumer who rents a
quality-qn car can be written as
R ∆
0 e−ρt[qnθ − rn] dt = 1−e−ρ∆
ρ [qnθ − rn]. The N + 1 rental prices
that sustain this equilibrium allocation can then be deﬁned exactly in the same way as the sorting





n+1, n = 0,1,...N (6)
where, by convention, r∗
N+1 = qN+1 = 0. These instantaneous rental prices are deﬁned by the
indiﬀerence of marginal type θ∗
n between renting a good of quality qn and renting a good of quality
qn+1. Also notice that the prices deﬁned in equation (6) are independent of ∆.
Under selling, the prices that sustain this consumer equilibrium are deﬁned by the expected
present value of rental prices (where the expectation is necessary since the time until the good














n, n = 0,1,...N (7)
where, by convention, p∗
N+1 = 0, and r∗
n is deﬁned in equation (6). The right-hand side of this
expression is the expected present value of the rental payment for a unit of a good of quality qn,
given that the consumer will stop renting it once the unit depreciates. In the left-hand side, the
expected present value of revenues from resale is subtracted from the price of the quality-qn good.
We use the term trickle-down to denote the process by which these goods are allocated in
equilibrium: the good trickles down from the high-valuation consumers to the low-valuation ones
as it declines in quality.
The equilibrium just described has the following key feature: the quality of any given unit of
the good oﬀered on the market can be exactly inferred from its vintage, i.e. the number of times
the unit has changed hands. A unit of vintage n is of quality qn.
Therefore, the equilibrium strategies described above can equivalently be formulated as follows:
for each n = 0,...,N, consumer types θ ∈ [θ∗
n,θ∗
n−1] rent or buy vintage-n cars, and keep the same
unit until it depreciates. Notice that, in order to implement these strategies, only the vintage of
a unit must be observed, not its quality. Yet, if all consumers follow these strategies, the ex-post
eﬃcient allocation will ensue, and qualities will be fully revealed. For this reason, we deem these
strategies revealing.
8If the car she is currently renting does not depreciate, a consumer is indiﬀerent between keeping the same unit
and renting another unit of the same quality.
93.2 Failure of Resale Markets under Asymmetric Information
We now turn to the analysis of the simple depreciation model with unobservable quality. Speciﬁcally,
assume that consumers cannot observe the quality of a speciﬁc car without using it. Moreover, a
consumer who is using a speciﬁc car at time t observes the time-t realization of the depreciation
process that determines the quality of the car at time t + 1. It is notationally convenient (but
without loss of generality) to assume that realizations of the depreciation process occur at the end
of each period.
We continue to assume that the trading history of each unit is observable. Thus, the revealing
strategies described in the previous section are still well-deﬁned, and it is natural to ask whether
they still constitute a consumer equilibrium.
Consider resale markets ﬁrst. We show that, if there are more than two qualities, under asym-
metric information, revealing strategies do not constitute a consumer equilibrium with resale.
Moreover, we show that there is no consumer equilibrium with resale that achieves the eﬃcient
allocation.
By analogy with the complete-information case, we begin by analyzing trading environments
consisting of N + 1 resale markets; a vintage-n unit is sold at a price pn, for n = 0,...,N.
Theorem 1 (i) If there are more than two qualities, in a system of resale markets, there is no set
of N + 1 vintage-dependent prices that supports the revealing strategy proﬁle.
(ii) If there are only two qualities, then there exists an ex-post eﬃcient consumer equilibrium.
Observe that both statements are true for any value of ∆.
Proof. (i) Assume (by contradiction) that a vintage-n car is indeed of quality qn. Denote
by Vn(θ) the ex-ante value of purchasing a vintage-n good, and then behaving as prescribed by
the vintage−n revealing strategy: keep the car until it depreciates to qn+1 and then buy another
vintage-n car. Denote by Wn(θ,qn) the value of already owning a car of quality qn for a consumer
who is a vintage-n consumer and who follows the policy just described. We have
Vn(θ) = −pn +
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ
qnθ + e−ρ∆[γn∆(Vn(θ) + pn+1) + (1 − γn∆)Wn(θ,qn)]




ρ qnθ − pn(1 − e−ρ∆(1 − γn∆)) + e−ρ∆γn∆pn+1
1 − e−ρ∆ (9)
In order to achieve the eﬃcient allocation, the following condition inducing eﬃcient ex-ante sorting
must be satisﬁed:
VN(θ∗
N) = 0, andVn(θ∗
n) = Vn+1(θ∗
n), for n = 0,...N − 1. (10)
These N + 1 equations determine prices p0,p1,...,pN. To obtain the eﬃcient allocation, these
prices must induce the right ex-post keeping behavior: no consumer in [θ∗
n−1,θ∗
n] should want to
10keep any good of quality lower than qn. We will show that, if equations 10 are satisﬁed, then the
consumer of type θ∗
n strictly prefers keeping quality qn+1. Note that the value of selling the good
is:
pn+1 + Vn(θ∗
n) = pn+1 + Vn+1(θ∗




ρ qn+1θ + e−ρ∆γn+1∆pn+2
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where the ﬁrst equality uses equation (10), the second equality uses equation 8 and the last equality
is just a solution for Wn+1 (θ∗
n). Consider the alternative strategy for the consumer of holding on to
the good until it depreciates to qn+2 and then following the policy of buying vintage n+1. Denote
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(pn+1 − pn+2) (12)
If we can show that pn > pn+1 for every n, we can conclude that keeping quality qn+1 is better than
selling it for type θ∗
n (and, given the continuity of payoﬀs with respect to θ, for all types suﬃciently
close to θ∗
n). We now claim that equation (10) implies that pn > pn+1, n = 0,1,...N −1. We prove




N−1(qN−1 − qN) + e−ρ∆γN∆pN = (pN−1 − pN)(1 − e−ρ∆(1 − γN−1∆))
since pN+1 = 0 because qN+1 = 0. Thus, pN−1 > pN and the claim is true for n = N − 1. Assume
the claim is true for n + 1 (i.e., pn+1 > pn+2). We can rewrite equation (10) as:
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ
θ(qn − qn+1) + e−ρ∆γn+1(pn+1 − pn+2) = (pn − pn+1)(1 − e−ρ∆(1 − γn∆))
so that pn > pn+1, which proves the inductive step.
(ii) If N = 1(i.e., there are only two qualities), existence of an eﬃcient equilibrium is established
if we can show that the prices deﬁned by equations (10) induce the correct keeping behavior. For
consumers of vintage 1, this is trivial. For consumers of vintage 0, the right keeping behavior
11requires that all type θ ≥ θ∗
0 be willing to sell the car the moment it depreciates to q1. This
requires that for all such θ’s,
p1 + V0(θ) ≥
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ
θq1 + e−ρ∆ (1 − γ1∆)p1 + e−ρ∆V0(θ). (13)









Note that the right hand side of this equation is equal to V1 (θ) (since p2 = 0). Thus, the ex-post
keeping condition is equivalent to the ex-ante condition that V0 (θ) ≥ V1 (θ), implying that all types
who buy vintage 0 will never want to keep quality q1.
The intuition for this result is the following. For revealing strategies to be an equilibrium with
resale markets, type θ∗
n must be just willing to be a vintage-n consumer ex-ante, i.e., Vn(θ∗
n) =
Vn+1(θ∗
n). Furthermore, he should be willing to sell the good as soon as it becomes of quality qn+1.
These two conditions together imply that he should be willing to sell a vintage-n good that just
depreciated to quality qn+1 and then buy a vintage-(n + 1) good whose quality (in equilibrium) is
qn+1. However, this cannot be optimal. The reason is that by keeping the vintage n car that is of
quality qn+1 until it depreciates again, the consumer enjoys a quality qn+1 good which he can then
sell for pn+1. In contrast, if he buys a vintage n + 1 car, he would still enjoy a quality qn+1 unit,
but would only be able to sell it for pn+2. Thus, it is less costly to consume qn+1 if one happens
to have a vintage-n good than it is to consume the same quality with a vintage n + 1 good: the
resale price is higher in the ﬁrst case. Note that this logic fails for n = N −1 because when a good
of quality N −1 depreciates twice it dies, and we have assumed that this event is observable. This
implies that eﬃciency is possible when N = 1.
Remark 1 Ineﬃciency does not vanish in the limit as ∆ → 0.
Proof. In the proof of part (i) of Theorem 1 we showed that in a system of resale markets buyers
have an incentive to keep the wrong qualities. Thus, it is enough to show that these incentives do
not disappear in the limit as ∆ → 0. To do this, recall that the right-hand side of equation (12)
expresses the (negative) payoﬀ from keeping quality qn+1 for the marginal type who should instead













Now suppose by contradiction that the limit allocation is eﬃcient. It is easy to show that then prices
must converge to the observable-quality prices implicitly described in equation (7); consequently,
(pn+1 − pn+2) must converge to a ﬁnite positive quantity. But this implies that the payoﬀ to type
12θ∗
n from keeping the lower quality qn+1 is bounded away from zero as ∆ → 0. Furthermore, since
payoﬀs are continuous in θ, the mass of types who beneﬁt from keeping the lower quality is bounded
away from zero as ∆ → 0. This contradicts the assumption that the limit allocation is eﬃcient,
and proves the claim.
We now show that the only candidate for an eﬃcient consumer equilibrium under resale is the
revealing strategy proﬁle. This result, jointly with Theorem 1, implies that there is no eﬃcient
consumer equilibrium under stochastic depreciation and resale. By Remark 1, this is true even in
the limit as ∆ → 0.
We consider K + 1 markets, numbered 0,...,K ≤ ∞. New cars are traded in market 0. For
all k = 1,...,K, equilibrium determines the price pk that clears market k, as well as the (average)
quality of cars traded in that market. We do not distinguish between markets where the same
qualities are traded and the same prices prevail.
Proposition 1 If there exists a system of K +1 resale markets and an equilibrium strategy proﬁle
that yields the eﬃcient allocation, then K = N and the consumer equilibrium consists of the
revealing strategy proﬁle.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that, if in some market k, positive masses of goods of two or more diﬀerent
qualities are sold, there is a positive mass of consumers who obtain cars of the wrong quality. But
this is ruled out by eﬃciency; hence, a single quality is traded in every market. Now consider the
markets where quality qN is traded; the price in all such markets must be equal to 1−e−ρ∆
ρ θNqN.9
Hence, in eﬀect, there is a unique market for quality-qN cars. Now suppose that qualities qm, for
m = n,...,N, are traded each in a unique market. Then, all cars of quality qn−1 must have the
same resale value, and by a similar argument to the one for quality-qN cars, it follows that the
market for quality-qn−1 cars is also unique. Hence, there are exactly N + 1 markets, one for each
quality. Furthermore, eﬃciency also implies that consumers of type θ ∈ [θ∗
n,θ∗
n−1] are only active
in market n.
3.3 Rental and Eﬃcency under Asymmetric Information
We now show that the set of instantaneous rental prices {r∗
n}N
n=0 that prevail under observable qual-
ity (cf. equation (6)) lead to the eﬃcient allocation even under asymmetric information. Speciﬁcally,
we consider rental contracts that specify an instantaneous rental price rn the consumer pays for
renting vintage n. Moreover, the consumer can keep renting the same unit as long as she wishes,
and stop paying the rental fee the moment she wishes to return the unit (without any cancellation
fees to the manufacturer). Consumers who have rented the speciﬁc unit in the past are not allowed
to rent the same unit. This prevents the consumers from strategically returning cars to lower their
rental payments.
Consider the ex-ante value Vn(θ) of pursuing the ex-post eﬃcient policy of renting vintage n
and keeping until (and only until) the good depreciates to qn+1. It is easy to see that
9This requires that endowments be ﬁnite; otherwise there could be sequences of increasing prices sustained by












Notice that Vn(θ) does not depend directly10 on the depreciation rate γn: the consumer immediately
replaces depreciated cars, and therefore eﬀectively enjoys a sequence of quality-qn cars.
We now verify that, given the observable-quality rental prices (equation 6), consumers optimally
follow eﬃcient policies. This requires: (i) the ex-ante sorting condition that types θ ∈ [θ∗
n,θ∗
n−1]
be willing to rent a vintage n car; (ii) the “ex-post keeping” condition that consumer types θ ∈
[θ∗
n,θ∗
n−1] not be willing to keep any quality below qn.
Condition (i) is satisﬁed if for every n, Vn(θ∗
n) = Vn+1(θ∗
n). Given equation (14), this condition




n+1 which is clearly satisﬁed given that {r∗
n}N
n=0 are deﬁned
by equation (6). That is, observable-quality rental prices are such that the self-selection conditions
are satisﬁed even if quality is not observable.
In contrast to the case of resale, ex-post keeping (condition (ii)) is automatically satisﬁed
under rental. No consumer has an incentive to keep any quality below the highest quality of any
vintage. Suppose that a consumer of type θ is renting vintage n and he is currently consuming
a quality-m good. Consuming this good for one period and then resuming tomorrow the eﬃcient
policy of only keeping quality qn yields a payoﬀ of 1−e−ρ∆
ρ [qmθ − r∗
n] + e−ρ∆Vn(θ). If instead the
consumer returns quality qm immediately to start the eﬃcient policy today, he obtains a payoﬀ of
Vn(θ) = 1−e−ρ∆
ρ [θqn − r∗
n] + e−ρ∆Vn(θ). We can therefore conclude that, under rental, incentives
to keep are always guaranteed to hold. Thus, the instantaneous rental prices {r∗
n}N
n=0 guarantee
that both ex-ante sorting and ex-post keeping incentives are consistent with the ex-post eﬃcient
allocation that obtains under observable quality. As above, note that the conclusion holds for any
positive value of ∆.
Theorem 2 If the goods are rented, there is a consumer equilibrium under asymmetric information
that features the same allocation, strategies, and instantaneous rental prices as under observable
quality.
3.4 Supply Side
We now consider the incentives of car producers. We will show that, if producers are competitive,
there is a market equilibrium where ﬁrms maximize proﬁts by renting the goods at the observable-
quality rental prices. Thus, eﬃcient sorting is achieved in equilibrium. Furthermore, the eﬃcient
amount of output is supplied. Thus, the equilibrium we characterize leads to the ﬁrst-best allocation
in spite of the presence of asymmetric information in secondary markets.
Assume that there is a unit measure of producers, each of whom has an opportunity to produce
a single unit of the good at a cost c in every period.11 Firms have the same instantaneous discount
factor ρ as consumers.
10Recall that rental prices are determined by cutoﬀ types, which in turn depend upon the depreciation rates.
11The assumption that a producer can produce only one unit every period ensures that each producer is ‘small’
and simpliﬁes the analysis considerably.
14Denote by R(y) the per-unit expected present value of revenue as a function of the total industry
output y. If this output is oﬀered according to the eﬃcient rental contracts, the value of this
revenue can be obtained recursively as follows. Deﬁne Rn(y) as the expected present value of





n(y) + e−ρ∆((1 − γn∆)Rn(y) + γn∆Rn+1(y)), n = 0,...N





1 − e−ρ∆(1 − γN∆)








j=0(1 − e−ρ∆(1 − γn+j∆))
Because every new unit is born with quality q0, it must be the case that R(y) = R0(y). It is
easy to see that R(y) is decreasing and continuous in y, because so is rn(y).12 We assume that
R(1) < c < R(0).13
Let y∗ be the output deﬁned by the solution of R(y∗) = c. This is the output that leads to zero
proﬁts for all ﬁrms in the industry. Since R(y) is decreasing and continuous, and R(1) < c < R(0),
y∗ exists and is unique.
We now construct a market equilibrium with the following features: a fraction y∗ of ﬁrms
produce each period. Active ﬁrms oﬀer rental contracts at instantaneous prices {r∗
n(y∗)}N
n=0. The
remaining 1−y∗ ﬁrms are inactive. Thus, the equilibrium under asymmetric information is identical
to the equilibrium that would obtain under observable quality.
To formalize the market equilibrium concept, we need to describe the class of contracts that
ﬁrms can oﬀer. Each ﬁrm can oﬀer a sequence of mechanisms, one for every consumer who enters
into a relationship with the ﬁrm during the lifetime of the car (recall that each ﬁrm produces a
single car). For instance, the rental contracts described in the previous subsection can be viewed
as a sequence of N + 1 mechanisms, each corresponding to a vintage; the consumer is induced to
return the car as soon as it depreciates, and a returned car previously oﬀered under the “vintage-
n” mechanism is oﬀered under the “vintage-(n + 1)” mechanism in the subsequent time period.
However, we can allow for more general mechanisms. Informally, each mechanism features the
following ingredients (see the Appendix for a formal description and analysis):
(i) the deviating ﬁrm partially or fully reveals information it has gathered concerning the car’s
previous quality history;
12Recall that each rn is determined by the indiﬀerence condition (6) involving the cutoﬀ type θn; in turn, the latter
is determined by equations (2) and (5), and is easily seen to be decreasing and continuous in y.
13Assuming R(0) > c implies that some production is viable. The assumption that R(1) < c guarantees that a unit
mass of ﬁrms is suﬃcient to exhaust industry proﬁts. We also want to avoid dealing with the case where costs are
so low that, under observable quality some qualities would be available at zero price. In this case, all qualities below
some level would not be purchased by anybody.
15(ii) upon entering the mechanism, and prior to receiving the car, the consumer pays a price r0
and sends a message m0;
(iii) at the end of each period k, the consumer sends a message mk and pays a price rk, which
may depend on all messages sent up to and including time k (where time is indexed relative to the
inception of the relationship between the consumer and the ﬁrm);
(iv) ﬁnally, the message mk indicates (possibly among other things) whether or not the consumer
desires to continue the relationship with the ﬁrm; similarly, after receiving the message mk, the
ﬁrm can indicate that it intends to terminate the mechanism. In the latter case, an additional
terminal transfer ¯ rk will be eﬀected.
The role of messages is twofold: ﬁrst, they allow the ﬁrm to design type-dependent payments
and consumption histories; second, they allow the ﬁrm to extract information about qualities. Of
course, the rental contracts in the previous subsection do not use any of this additional structure:
they are very simple contracts.
Our assumptions allow for considerable ﬂexibility in designing mechanisms. The following
examples illustrate possible speciﬁcations of the mechanism parameters.
(i) a ﬁrm may choose to fully reveal the quality history of the car, or nothing at all (so the
consumer does not learn whether she is receiving a new or used car), or perhaps only reveal whether
the current quality is above some threshold;
(ii) the consumer may be asked to report her type θ upon entering the mechanism, via the
message m0; on the other hand, no initial report may be required;
(iii) at the end of each period, the consumer may be asked to report whether a depreciation
has occurred, and her period payment rk might reﬂect the current quality of the car; on the other
hand, there may be no communication and/or transfers until the consumer returns the car;
(iv) the mechanism may last until the car dies (as in a sales contract), or it may last for a
pre-speciﬁed number of periods, or until the car has depreciated to some quality level.
In order to focus on the distortions caused by adverse selection, we abstract from issues related
to lack of commitment; that is, we assume that each ﬁrm is bound to the menu of mechanisms it
announces. We also emphasize that we make the strong informational assumption that consumers
observe the entire contract terms oﬀered by a ﬁrm. Note however that, it would be easy to enrich
the model to show that, given that other ﬁrms publicize their contract terms, it is optimal for a
ﬁrm to also do so, because hiding prior contract terms would be construed as a bad signal about
the history of the unit that the ﬁrm rents.
Finally, we assume that ﬁrms expect consumers to best-respond to the mechanisms they oﬀer,
both on and oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Theorem 3 The following constitutes a market equilibrium for any ∆ > 0:
(i) ﬁrms produce the ﬁrst-best output y∗, and oﬀer N + 1 vintage-dependent rental contracts at
the instantaneous rental prices r0,...,rN determined by equation (6);
(ii) for every n = 0,...,N, consumer types θ ∈ [θ∗
n,θ∗
n−1] rent vintage-n cars and only keep
cars of quality qn, where the cutoﬀs θ∗
0,...,θ∗
N are determined by equation (5).
The proof of this result is in the Appendix; we now provide a brief sketch of the argument.
Individual rationality implies that a consumer of type θ ∈ [θn,θn−1] will agree to transact with a
16deviating ﬁrm under some mechanism M only if the value of participating in mechanism M, then
reverting to renting vintage-n cars is at least as large as her payoﬀ if she rents vintage-n cars forever.
This provides an upper bound on the revenues that a deviating ﬁrm may obtain from mechanism
M by transacting with type θ. We employ this bound to show that any deviation is dominated
by a menu of one-period rental contracts, each targeted to a speciﬁc consumer type. The deviator
fully reveals the quality history of the car, and chooses each rental price so as to leave the target
type indiﬀerent between (i) renting the deviator’s car in the current period, then continuing with
her designated putative equilibrium rental contract, and (ii) employing her designated putative
equilibrium contract in the current as well as in all subsequent periods.
We then show that consumer indiﬀerence implies that the rental prices charged by the deviator
for each quality cannot exceed the rental prices for vintages deﬁned by equation (6); hence, there
can be no proﬁtable deviation. Furthermore, since industry output equals y∗, which is determined
by the zero-proﬁt condition, no new entry can occur.
3.5 Discussion
We now provide some discussion of the results and of the assumptions of the stochastic depreciation
model.
3.5.1 Contract characteristics
For rental contracts to implement the eﬃcient allocation, it is important that contracts be of
indeterminate duration; a rental contract that required that the good be returned after some ﬁxed
number of periods would not lead to the eﬃcient allocation. To see this, recall that the key feature
of the mechanism is that the vintage of the good is a perfect signal of quality. Thus, the trading
behavior of consumers must signal the depreciation history. If a consumer were required to return
the good after a ﬁxed number of periods, then the fact that the good is returned would not convey
any information regarding its quality—the good may or may not have depreciated by the time the
good is returned.
A menu of leasing contracts would not lead to an eﬃcient allocation either. A leasing contract
consists of two prices: a rental price that the consumer pays for a pre-speciﬁed length of time, and
a purchase price that the consumer pays at the end of the period if he chooses to purchase the unit.
Thus, a leasing contract suﬀers from a combination of the shortcomings of resale markets and of the
type of ﬁxed-duration rental contracts just discussed. To see this, we need to consider two cases: (1)
either the consumer returns the good at the termination of the lease for all depreciation histories,
or, (2) for some depreciation histories, the consumer purchases the good at the termination of
the lease. In case (1), it is not possible to infer the quality of the good from the behavior of the
consumer. Therefore, at some point in the future, potential consumers of the unit are uncertain
about the quality of the good. This means that, with positive probability, the good is allocated
ineﬃciently for at least one period. In case (2), eﬃciency requires that the consumer who purchases
the good sell it once it depreciates. However, the consumer now faces incentives that are similar to
those she faces in a system of resale markets, and we have seen that eﬃciency cannot be obtained
in that case either.
17The ineﬃciency of leasing contracts is in contrast with the result obtained by Johnson and
Waldman (2001), who show that leasing contracts can lead to eﬃciency. The diﬀerence is due to
the fact that in Johnson and Waldman (2001) there are only two consumer types and, as in Hendel
and Lizzeri (2002), the timing of depreciation is deterministic.
Finally, we observe that, if ﬁrms could observe the quality of a used car, and they could commit
to credibly revealing it, then eﬃciency could be achieved via a sequence of resale transactions.
Observe that, if quality is observable, by equation (7), consumers are indiﬀerent between (1) renting
the same vintage-n car at rental price r∗
n given by equation (6) until it depreciates, and (2) buying a
vintage-n car at price p∗
n and reselling it to other consumers at price p∗
n+1 as soon as it depreciates.
Now suppose that ﬁrms can observe quality; then they can act as intermediaries in secondary
markets by buying used goods and certifying their quality. Speciﬁcally, types θ ∈ [θ∗
n,θ∗
n−1] buy a
vintage-n car at the price p∗
n, keep it until it depreciates, then resell it to a ﬁrm for a price of p∗
n+1
and buy another vintage-n car; the ﬁrm then resells the car in the vintage-(n + 1) market, at a
price of p∗
n+1. As long as ﬁrms certify that vintage-n cars are of quality qn, consumer incentives are
the same as under rental contracts so that eﬃcient sorting will obtain in a consumer equilibrium.
Our proof of Theorem 3 can be adapted to show that there is a market equilibrium in which ﬁrms
truthfully certify quality and buy and sell cars at the prices p∗
n as indicated above.
Ineﬃciency of resale markets depends on the presence of asymmetric information. If ﬁrms, like
consumers in our model, cannot observe the quality of a used car prior to owning or using it, the
above transactions cannot occur in equilibrium: the argument is analogous to the proof of Theorem
1.
3.5.2 Strict incentives
In the model of rental contracts of Section 3.3, as long as the unit has not depreciated, consumers
are indiﬀerent between continuing to rent the same unit, and renting another unit of the same
vintage. However, for the vintage of a good to serve its signaling role, it is important that a
consumer choose to continue to rent the same unit as long as it does not depreciate. This may raise
some concerns about the robustness of the mechanism. However, we can make a small modiﬁcation
of the contracts to guarantee that consumers have strict incentives to hold on to their units as
long as they do not depreciate, while maintaining their incentives to get rid of the good once it




n is the rental price paid in the ﬁrst period of rental of vintage n, and rs
n is the rental
price for subsequent periods. To guarantee strict incentives to keep the good when it does not
depreciate, all we need is that rs
n < r0
n. It turns out that we can choose rental prices that satisfy
this constraint without aﬀecting any of the other incentives, i.e., (1) the incentives to choose the
right vintage ex-ante, and (2) the incentives to return the good when it does depreciate.14




n+1. To guarantee (1) we just need to choose the set of ﬁrst-period
rental prices {r
0
n} so as to equalize the ex-ante values of marginal consumers of consuming vintage n and vintage
n + 1, given that they will be paying the slightly smaller prices r
s
n to keep renting the units. In other words, relative
to rn as set by equation 6, we lower r
s
n and raise r
0
n to keep the values of the marginal types unchanged.
183.5.3 The depreciation process
Observe that Theorems 1 and 2 continue to hold if the special assumption that the rate of depreci-
ation is constant through time does not hold. We could allow for a much more general depreciation
process where the probability that a car depreciates is a function of the age of the unit. It is
easy to see that a menu of rental contracts leads to eﬃcient sorting also in this more complicated
environment: the value to a consumer of following the eﬃcient policy is unchanged relative to equa-
tion 14. Furthermore, the incentive to return a unit once it depreciates is essentially unchanged.
Showing that resale markets fail to implement the eﬃcient allocation is more complex since the
value functions are now more complicated, but the logic is the same. Finally, while the structure
of the proof of Theorem 3 relies on stationarity, we conjecture that the result would still hold when
depreciation is time-dependent.
Note also that Theorem 2 does not rely on the depreciation rate being observable. Consumers
just need to know that, by renting vintage n, they can obtain a quality-qn good. Indeed, none of the
calculations concerning consumer incentives in the discussion preceding (and proving) Theorem 2
depend on the probability of depreciation. Thus, the depreciation rate could even be private
information to the consumers who have previously consumed the good (or to the ﬁrms producing
them): Theorem 2 would continue to hold.15 Of course, observability of depreciation rates would
matter for the case of resale markets. We conjecture that private information about the depreciation
rates would lead to even larger distortions in this case.
On the other hand, the exact eﬃciency result of this section does rely in an important way
on the fact that depreciation occurs one step at a time, since this implies that, in equilibrium,
the quality of the good is known. If at any point in time the quality of the good can decrease
by one or more than one step, then it is not possible to obtain ﬁrst-best eﬃciency through rental
contracts. However, we show in Section 4 that, even if depreciation can occur in more than one
step, approximate eﬃciency obtains if the time between periods is small.
3.5.4 Noise traders
Suppose that there is a fraction of consumers who have to trade for exogenous reasons (e.g., moving
to another country). This phenomenon has been explored by Greenwald (1986) in a modiﬁcation of
Akerlof’s adverse selection model. In his model, the presence of such ‘noise traders’ has a positive
welfare eﬀect because it increases the volume of trade. Greenwald showed that noise traders generate
a multiplier eﬀect because they cause a price increase which induces some non-noise traders to sell
generating more beneﬁcial trades. In contrast, in our model, noise traders would have a negative
welfare eﬀect because they would make the vintage a less precise signal of quality. A car of vintage
n may be returned by a noise trader prior to depreciation, when its quality is still qn; this car
would now be of vintage n + 1, and it would therefore end up in the hands of a consumer with
lower valuation who should be consuming quality qn+1 instead. Note however, that this distortion
may not be too large. First, the good would go to some consumer in the interval [θn+1,θn] instead
15Equations (1)–(4) must clearly be adapted to distinguish between cars characterized by the same quality, but
diﬀerent depreciation rates. However, by returning cars immediately upon depreciation, consumers can secure a
constant stream of quality-qn cars, regardless of depreciation rates. This suﬃces to extend Theorem 2.
19of some consumer in [θn,θn−1]; these intervals are “close” if there are many qualities. Second, the
good is misallocated only until it depreciates, because at that point the vintage-(n + 1) consumer
will keep the good, which is now the right match for him. Rental prices would have to be adjusted
to reﬂect these misallocations, but the adjustment is minor as long as the fraction of noise traders
is not too large.
3.5.5 Discreteness
We have assumed that there is a ﬁnite number of possible qualities. While we have not analyzed a
version of the model with a continuum of qualities, we can consider what happens in the present
setting when the discrete grid of qualities approaches a continuous interval [qN,q0]. More precisely,
consider the following two distributions of qualities: the ﬁrst is a distribution {q0,...,qN} with
quality qn having mass λn; the second is a distribution {q0,0,q0,1,....,q0,K; q1,0,q1,1,...,q1,K; ....;
qN,0,qN,1,...,qN,K}, where the sum of the mass of qualities qn,0,...qn,K is equal to λn. Clearly,
rental contracts implement the ex-post eﬃcient allocation for both quality distributions; the only
diﬀerence is the number of possible vintages.
In the case of resale markets, equation (12) may suggest that the incentives to keep the wrong-
quality good become negligible as the quality grid becomes ﬁner—so that one might conjecture that,
if there is a continuum of qualities, there is no such incentive. However, consider the marginal type
θn,0, i.e. the consumer who is ex-ante indiﬀerent between the vintages corresponding to qualities
qn,0 and qn,1. While it is true that, for this consumer, the gains from keeping quality qn,1 are very
small if K is large, the gains from keeping quality qn+1,0 = qn+1 are clearly of the same order of
magnitude as they are in the model in which K = 1. Thus, the ineﬀectiveness of resale markets
does not appear to depend on the discreteness of the quality distribution.
3.5.6 Equilibrium Under Selling: observable vs unobservable trading histories
Theorem 1 shows that, with resale markets and three or more qualities, there is no eﬃcient equi-
librium. In order to analyze the nature of the distortions generated by asymmetric information,
we now fully characterize equilibrium in a setting with three qualities. Furthermore, to clarify
the role of observability of trading histories under resale markets, we compare our framework with
observable vintages to a scenario in which consumers can only distinguish new and used goods, but
do not observe the number of times a good has been traded.
We construct equilibria wherein prices do not depend on calendar time and/or the age of the
car. Of course, consumers do observe calendar time, and can also be assumed to observe the age
of the car. Due to stationarity, given the current quality of the car, neither of these variables
inﬂuences future realizations of the depreciation process. Thus, if prices are also independent of
calendar time and age of the car, these variables cannot inﬂuence consumers’ optimal decisions;
and, if this is the case, then equilibrium prices will in fact be independent of these variables. In
other words, equilibrium behavior and prices can be independent of age and calendar time, even
though these variables are observable. There may exist other equilibria that do not exhibit this
property.
20It is clear from our Theorem 2 that, under rental, observability of trading histories is beneﬁcial.
If consumers could not observe the vintage of a car, matching would, by necessity, be much coarser.
However, under resale markets, the equilibrium allocation is ineﬃcient, so it is not immediately
clear that observability is similarly beneﬁcial. For example, as mentioned in the Introduction,
House and Leahy (2001), in a diﬀerent setup, show that observing trading histories can have a
negative welfare impact.
As we have seen in Theorem 1 three is the minimal number of qualities such that asymmetric
information introduces distortions in resale markets. Going beyond three qualities is conceptually
simple but tedious and adds no new insight.
Observable Vintages In a steady state equilibrium, the set of consumer types is partitioned
into four intervals: (1) types in [θ,θ2] never buy any car; (2) types in [θ2,θ1] buy vintage 2; (3)




buy vintage 0. Denote by qe
n the average
quality of cars that were vintage n−1 the previous date and just became vintage n; in other words,
qe
n is the average quality of cars that were just traded. Clearly, qe
0 = q0. The following proposition
characterizes equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (i) There exists a consumer equilibrium under resale with observable vintages. In
this equilibrium:
(ii) qe
2 = q2 ≤ qe
1 < q1.
(iii) Buyers of vintage-2 cars keep their cars until they die. Buyers of vintage-1 cars keep quality-q1
cars and sell quality-q2 cars. Finally, there exists θ0 ∈ (θ01,¯ θ] such that types θ ∈ [θ0,1,θ0] buy




buy vintage 0, keep q0
only, and sell all other qualities.
The proof of this proposition can be found in a “Web Appendix” available from the authors’
Web sites. A few observations are in order.
First, only quality-q2 cars are sold as vintage 2 goods; for this reason, qe
2 = q2. On the other
hand, since q2 ≤ qe
1 < q1, a positive mass of cars that are oﬀered on the market as vintage-1 goods
must be of quality q2. Part (iii) implies that no quality-q0 car is ever oﬀered for resale.
Note also that, while θ0 > θ01, there are parameter values for which θ0 = θ. That is, it is always
the case that some high types buy vintage-0 cars and keep both qualities q0 and q1; however, it may
be the case that all high types adopt this policy. In such cases, no cars of quality q1 are oﬀered for
resale, and the equilibrium eﬀectively features two vintages.
Unobservable Vintages Now assume that consumers cannot distinguish goods that have been
sold only once from goods that have been sold more than once. In this environment, consumers are
partitioned into three intervals (1) types in [θ,θ2] who never buy any car; (2) types in [θ2,θu] who




who buy who buy vintage 0. Denote by qu the average quality
of used cars. The following proposition characterizes equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (i) There exists a consumer equilibrium under resale with unobservable vintages.
In this equilibrium:
21(ii) q2 ≤ qu < q1.
(iii) Buyers of used cars keep quality-q1 cars and sell quality-q2 cars. There exists θ0 ∈ (θu,¯ θ] such




buy new cars, only keep q0, and sell all other qualities.
The proof of this proposition is available in the Web Appendix.
Thus, a positive mass of used cars is of quality q2. However, no quality-q0 cars are oﬀered for
resale.
The behavior of new good consumers is qualitatively the same as that of vintage-zero consumers
in the case of observable quality. The behavior of used good consumers reﬂects a form of arbitrage:
speciﬁcally, a consumer who owns a used good of quality q2 can sell it at a price pu and buy
another used good for the same price. If qu > q2, which is the case whenever θ0 < ¯ θ, all used goods
consumers are better oﬀ selling quality-q2 used goods and only keeping quality-q1 cars.
Finally, as above, it is always the case that some high types keep both qualities q0 and q1 (i.e.
θ0 > θu); furthermore, for certain parameter values, all high types adopt this policy (i.e. θ0 = ¯ θ).
Comparison of the two scenarios and the role of observable vintages The diﬀerences in
equilibrium outcomes between the two scenarios16 may be understood by focusing on two forces.
Suppose ﬁrst that the resale behavior of new goods consumers is the same in the two scenarios.
Then, multiple secondary markets allow better sorting of used units. Loosely speaking, the ability to
distinguish between two used-car vintages eﬀectively unbundles goods sold by new goods consumers;
within at most two periods, quality-q1 goods are allocated to vintage-1 consumers, and quality-q2
goods are allocated to vintage-2 consumers. Thus, higher-quality used cars are assigned to higher-
valuation consumers. If instead vintages are unobservable, such unbundling is impossible and all
consumers who are not new goods consumers end up consuming the same average quality over their
lifetimes.
Second, in the case of unobservable vintages, cars that are sold by new goods consumers are
pooled with quality-q2 cars that are sold by used goods consumers.17 Such pooling will reduce the
resale value of new goods, and this will induce a higher fraction of new goods consumers to keep
quality-q1 cars.
A direct comparison of the equilibrium allocations in the two scenarios cannot be provided
because the overall equilibrium cannot be solved for in closed form. We therefore proceeded nu-
merically. In our extensive numerical analysis, we always found social surplus to be higher when
vintages are observable.
We now brieﬂy describe the computations we carried out. The model parameters are the quality
levels q0,q1,q2, per-period depreciation probabilities γ0,γ1,γ2, the instantaneous discount factor ρ,
the total mass of cars Y , and the distribution of consumer types F. As noted above, the lenght ∆
of each period is immaterial to the analysis of the simple depreciation model, so we set ∆ = 1 for
16This discussion assumes that θ0 ∈ (θ01,¯ θ) in the observable-vintages case, and θ0 ∈ (θu,¯ θ) when vintages are




is empty in both scenarios, the allocations are the same.
17These include consumers who owned quality q1 units that depreciated, and those who purchased a used good the
previous period and found its quality to be q2.
22simplicity. For reasons of numerical tractability, we assume that types are uniformly distributed
on [0,1].18
Consider ﬁrst the observable-vintage model. Once values for the above parameters have been
speciﬁed, the cutoﬀ types θ01,θ1,θ2 can be computed in closed form. Moreover, for every choice
of θ0 ∈ (θ01,¯ θ], prices and value functions for each cutoﬀ type can also be explicitly computed.
Then, a simple line search algorithm is used to determine the value of θ0 for which a consumer of
type θ = θ0 who does not own a car is just indiﬀerent between (a) buying vintage 0 and keeping
quality q0 only, and (b) buying vintage 0 and keeping q0 and q1. Finally, social surplus can be
easily computed given the values of the cutoﬀ types thus determined.
Calculations for the unobservable-vintage model are analogous: ﬁrst, the cutoﬀ types θu and
θ2 are computed from parameter values; then, θ0 ∈ (θu,¯ θ] is determined via a line search; ﬁnally,
social surplus can be calculated.
In addition to comparing social surplus in the two models, we computed two measures of the
eﬃciency gain resulting from vintage observability, as follows. Let Sv and Snv denote per-period
surplus under observable and unobservable vintages respectively; also let Seﬀ denote per-period
surplus under the eﬃcient allocation. Finally, let S1 denote per-period surplus in the absence of






E(q) · θ dθ.
This represents the maximum surplus that can be achieved by opening a single market (i.e. the
market for new goods): the 1 − Y consumers with low valuation for quality are excluded from
consumption, but cars are randomly allocated among the Y higher-valuation consumers.
One possible measure of relative eﬃciency is then Sv
Seﬀ − Snv
Seﬀ , the diﬀerence between the fraction
of the eﬃcient social surplus realized with and without vintage observability. Alternatively, we can
measure realized eﬃciency as a fraction of Seﬀ −S1, the maximum possible eﬃciency gain relative
to a single-market environment; the quantities Sv−S1
Seﬀ −S1 and Snv−S1
Seﬀ −S1 are the fractions of this gain
actually realized under observable and unobservable vintages respectively, so another measure of
relative eﬃciency is their diﬀerence So−Su
Se−S1.
Notice that, for the purposes of comparing social surplus, the minimum and maximum quality
levels can be chosen arbitrarily; we set q0 = 1 and q2 = 0. Hence, a full parameterization of both
models involves chosing the values of q1 ∈ [q2,q0], γ0,γ1,γ2, ρ and Y .
In order to explore the parameter space, we ﬁrst ﬁxed values of ρ and Y ; we then generated
values of q1 ∈ (q2,q0) lying on a grid of pre-speciﬁed size M. Finally, we generated depreciation
probabilities by specifying minimum and maximum probabilities γmin,γmax, and then generating
γ0,γ1,γ2 ∈ [γmin,γmax] on a grid of size M.
In one series of numerical experiments, we chose e−ρ = 0.9 and Y = 0.8, and speciﬁed a grid
size of M = 20 points; Table 1 summarizes some of our ﬁndings. The columns correspond to a
diﬀerent choice of minimum and maximum depreciation probabilities. In rows 4 and 5, we report
18We also ran some experiments with Beta-distributed consumer types. Again,we found social surplus to be higher
when vintages are observable.
23High Depreciation Low Depreciation
γmin =0.1, γmax =0.9 γmin =0.01, γmax =0.1
Max Min Max Min
Sv−Snv
Seﬀ 5.49% 0 8.31% 0
Sv−Snv
Seﬀ −S1 18.6% 0 41.87% 0
Sv
Seﬀ – 89.87% – 92.81%
Sv−S1
Seﬀ −S1 – 38.14% – 42.53%
S1
Seﬀ 95.90% 62.48% 96.20% 62.26%
Table 1: Eﬃciency Gains
the maximum and minimum eﬃciency gains due to vintage observability according to two diﬀerent
measures, calculated over the 204 = 160,000 diﬀerent parameterizations generated by the choice
of γmin,γmax. As noted above, in all our calculations, vintage observability was always beneﬁcial;
however, for certain parameter values, the equilibrium was the same regardless of whether vintages
are observable or not (i.e no quality-q1 cars are traded in either setting); in these cases the eﬃciency
gain was zero. The ﬁgures in row 5 suggest that the eﬃciency gain from vintage observability,
especially when measured relative to a single-market environment, can be substantial, and are
larger when depreciations are less frequent.
The sixth and seventh rows report the minimum realized eﬃciency gain Sv
Seﬀ under resale mar-
kets and observable vintages, and the minimum realized gain Sv−S1
Seﬀ −S1 relative to a single-market
environment. Since rental contracts achieve the eﬃcient allocation, these quantities measure the
potential ineﬃciency associated with resale. Recall that, according to Theorem 1, eﬃciency obtains
even with resale contracts if there are only two qualities; hence, the maximum realized eﬃciency
gain can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by choosing q1 very near q0 or q2. For this reason, it is not
explicitly indicated in Table 1.
We wish to emphasize that the numbers in row 6 correspond to “worst-case scenarios”, i.e.
parameter values for which resale markets perform particularily poorly. For diﬀerent parameter
values, the gains from using rental contracts rather than selling contracts are not very large. This
may help explain why rental contracts are not commonly observed in the car market; perhaps the
gains are not large enough to justify the larger administrative costs, and the potential problems of
moral hazard in maintenance that are likely to be associated with rental contracts. Furthermore,
we note that leasing contracts (which constitute more than a third of transactions in the new car
market) share some of the advantages of rental contracts—although, as pointed out in Section 3.5.1,
the two are not perfect substitutes.
Finally, the last row reports the minimum and maximum surplus achievable in a single-market
environment; these ﬁgures can be useful as a reference.
244 General Depreciation Model
We now consider the general environment described in Section 2.1. Recall that, in contrast with the
model discussed in Section 3, we now assume that the initial quality of the new good is uncertain,
and that the good may depreciate by an arbitrary number of quality steps (or die) in any time
period.
As for the simple depreciation model, in the observable-quality benchmark, eﬃciency requires
assortative matching of qualities to consumers. It is easy to verify that the system of instantaneous
rental prices deﬁned by equation (6) still sustain the eﬃcient allocation.
4.1 Experimentation and the Trickle-Down Algorithm
Assume now that the quality of the good is not observable before purchase: it becomes observable
only to the current user at the end of the ﬁrst period of consumption. The key distinction between
the present model and the simple one-step depreciation model presented in Section 3 is the fact
that eﬃcient sorting now requires experimentation: for instance, highest-valuation consumers need
to try several units before ﬁnding one of quality q0.
Consequently, in the environment under consideration, it is impossible to obtain the ﬁrst-best
allocation: the ﬁrst consumer of the good consumes the ‘wrong’ quality with positive probability.
However, we will show that approximate payoﬀ eﬃciency is possible when the length of the periods
∆ shrinks to zero (i.e. trading becomes more and more frequent).
As in the simpler setting of Section 3, we assume that the vintage of each car is observable. For
n = 0,...,N and m = n,...,N, denote by vn
m the mass of cars of vintage n and quality m. These
quantities must satisfy the following equations:
v0
0 = γ0,0(∆)v0















That is: vintage-0 cars consists of quality-q0 cars that have not depreciated, and newly-produced
cars. Since vintage-0 cars worse than q0 are immediately retraded, the stock of quality-qm cars of
vintage 0, for m > 0, consists solely of newly-produced cars. Vintage-n cars of quality qn come from
three sources: vintage-n, quality-qn cars that have not depreciated, vintage-(n − 1) quality-qn−1
cars that have depreciated to qn, and vintage-(n − 1) quality-qn cars that have not depreciated.
Vintage-n cars of quality worse than qn all come from the stock of vintage-(n − 1) cars, and are
immediately retraded.
Observe that the masses vn
m, for n 6= m, measure the eﬃciency loss due to the fact that
consumers need to experiment in order to receive a car of their designated quality.














k = Y. (17)
We can now deﬁne cutoﬀ types to identify consumers of each vintage. Let θ−1 = θ for notational
convenience; then, for n = 0,...,N, let θn be deﬁned by the condition





4.2 Rental and Experimentation under Asymmetric Information
We now turn to the analysis of consumer incentives. Each consumer is facing a stationary, inﬁnite-
horizon dynamic programming problem, with states ∅ (corresponding to the event that the car
just died), q0,...,qN. The possible actions (controls) are “rent your current car for an additional
period” (not available in state ∅) and “return your current car, if any, and rent a vintage-n car”, for
n = 0,...,N. The transition probabilities are determined by actions and depreciation probabilities
in the obvious way. As in the simpler setting of Section 3, we represent rental fees by means of
instantaneous rental prices r0,...,rN.
In order to describe the value functions, it is useful to introduce additional notation. The
probability that a newly rented vintage-n car is of quality qm equals
λ0














for m = n,...,N. These expressions are derived by looking at the supply of vintage-n cars of
each quality, as it appears in Eqs. (15); for vintage 0, the supply consists solely of newly produced
cars, whose quality is distributed according to the proportions χ0,...,χN. For vintages n > 0,
the supply consists of vintage-(n − 1) cars, and we keep track of the various ways a quality-qm car
might be oﬀered in the vintage-n market according to the trickle-down algorithm.
We denote the expectation operator corresponding to the distribution λn
n,...,λn
N by En; for




`. Note that, although the notation does not emphasize
this fact, both λn
m and En are also a function of ∆.
26By standard arguments, there exists a stationary policy that is optimal for the consumer. We
now describe the set of stationary policies. If the current state is ∅ (no car), the policy must
specify which vintage to rent: thus, this portion of the policy can be represented by an integer
n ∈ {0,...,N}. If the current state is instead qn, for n = 0,...,N, the policy must specify whether
to keep the current car (i.e. rent the currently rented unit for another time period), or return it
and rent another car. A consumer who chooses to return her current car faces the same problem as
a consumer whose car has just died: hence, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to
policies that prescribe that the same vintage be rented if the current car dies, or if it is returned.
Such policies are thus fully speciﬁed by a pair (n,M), where n ∈ {0,...,N} is the vintage the
consumer rents in state ∅, and M ⊂ {n,...,N} is a (possibly empty) collection of quality indices
corresponding to qualities the consumer keeps.19
Consider one such stationary policy (n,M) with M 6= ∅ (see Lemma 3 for the case M = ∅).
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We now deﬁne the instantaneous rental prices r0,...rN so as to ensure that
V N
{N}(θN,∅) = 0, V n
{n}(θn,∅) = V n+1
{n+1}(θn,∅), n = 0,...,N − 1. (23)
The main result of this paper can now be stated.
Theorem 4 There exists ∆∗ > 0 such that, for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆∗), there is a consumer equilibrium
wherein cutoﬀ types and instantaneous rental prices are determined by equations (18) and (23)
19In general, one cannot guarantee a priori (without ﬁxing rental prices and solving for the optimal policy) that
restricting attention to cutoﬀ policies—i.e. M = {n,...,m} for some m ≥ n—will be w.l.o.g.. Intuitively, without
restrictions on the depreciation probabilities γn,m, it may be the case that a car of current quality qn+1 yields a
expected discounted utility than a car of current quality qn (e.g. if quality qn+1 depreciates slowly, whereas qn does
not depreciate but dies with high probability).
27respectively, and for every n = 0,...,N, consumer types θ ∈ [θn,θn−1] rent vintage-n cars and only
keep cars of quality qn.
Furthermore, as ∆ → 0, cutoﬀ types and instantaneous rental prices converge to their observable-
quality counterparts: θn → θ∗
n and rn → r∗
n for all n = 0,...,N.
We prove this result via several lemmas.
We ﬁrst establish that the Eqs. (15), (16) and (17) uniquely determine masses in each stage
of the trickle-down algorithm, and show that these masses converge to the appropriate eﬃcient
quantities as the length of each time period shrinks.
Lemma 1 There is a unique solution to Eqs. (15), (16) and (17). Furthermore, as ∆ → 0, for
every n = 0,...N, m vn
n → v∗
n and vn
m → 0 for m = n+1,...N. Consequently, θn → θ∗
n as ∆ → 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Turn now to consumer incentives. The following Lemma provides the key step in the proof of
Theorem 4: it shows that the value functions V n
{n}(θ,∅) can be written as a weighted average of
a “long-run” component, which corresponds to the net payoﬀ from renting a car of known quality
qn in each period, and an “experimentation” component; furthermore, the weight on the latter
vanishes as ∆ → 0. This is then shown to imply that rental prices, as deﬁned above, converge to
their observable-quality counterparts as ∆ → 0.
Lemma 2 For every n = 0,...,N,
V n
{n}(θ,∅) = (1 − wn)









n(1−Gn∆) ∈ (0,1), and wn → 1 as ∆ → 0. Therefore, the rental
prices deﬁned in equation (23) satisfy rn → r∗
n as ∆ → 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now employ the decomposition of payoﬀs provided in Lemma 2 to show that experimentation
policies of the form (n,M) with M 6= {n} cannot be optimal for any type, and “pure-consumption”
policies (M = ∅) can be disregarded w.l.o.g.
Lemma 3 There exists ∆∗ > 0 such that, for ∆ ∈ (0,∆∗), and for all θ, the policies (n,M) with
M 6= {n} are suboptimal. Furthermore, for every n = 0,...,N, every ∆, and every θ, in each
state ∅,q0,...,qN, the policy (n,∅) is not strictly better than the policy (n,{n}).
Proof. Consider type θ and policy (n,M), and let m = max M; by Lemma 2, there exists
∆n,m > 0 such that, for ∆ ∈ (0,∆n,m),
qmθ−rn




ρ = V n
{n}(θ,∅)
and qm ≤ wnqn ≤ (1 − wn)En(q|q ≤ qn) + wnqn =
∂V n
{n}(θ,∅)
∂θ (1 − e−ρ∆). This implies that, for
28∆ ∈ (0,∆n,m),
qmθ−rn
ρ < V n
{n}(θ,∅) for all types θ. Now consider one such ∆, and suppose that
(n,M) is optimal for some type θ. Then, in particular, V n
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1 − e−ρ∆(1 − Gm∆)
V n
m(θ,∅);
it follows that V n
M(θ,qm) < V n
M(θ,∅): that is, renting another car of vintage n and then reverting to
(n,M) is more proﬁtable for type θ than following the policy (n,M) if her current car is of quality
qm, i.e. the lowest quality the consumer is supposed to keep under policy (n,M).
Choosing ∆∗ = minn,m ∆n,m completes the proof of the ﬁrst claim. As for the second, for any
type θ and any n = 0,...,N, the policy (n,∅) yields
En(q|q≤qn)θ−rn
ρ in any state; by Lemma 2,
V n




ρ , with wn ∈ [0,1]. Since En(q|q ≤ qn) ≤ qn for all
n = 0,...,N, it follows that, in any state ∅,q0,...,qN, the consumer is at least as well oﬀ returning
the current car and switching to the policy (n,{n}).
The argument can now be concluded. An optimal policy of the form (n,M) exists for every
θ ∈ [θN,¯ θ]; by Lemma 3, for ∆ ∈ (0,∆∗), we can restrict attention to policies of this class with
M = {n}. But rental prices are deﬁned so as to ensure that, for all types θ ∈ [θn,θn−1], it is
optimal to adopt policy (n,{n}) in state ∅ and adhere to it in the continuation; hence, (n,{n})
must be an optimal policy for these types.
4.3 Supply Side in the General Depreciation Model
The analysis of producers’ incentives is more delicate than in the simple depreciation environment.
Since initial quality is uncertain and depreciation by more than one quality level is possible, ex-
perimentation is necessary in the trickle-down mechanism for consumers to obtain the ‘right’ car
quality. This implies that some delay is inevitable before the right match between cars and con-
sumers is achieved. When the time between periods ∆ is small, this delay is short; however, the
presence of this delay raises the possibility that producers may choose to deviate from the menu of
rental contracts to oﬀer a mechanism that accelerates experimentation. For instance, a ﬁrm might
require consumers to report the current quality of the car when they return it, then oﬀer it to the
‘right’ consumer type in the following period. Even in the absence of such reports, it can be shown
that proﬁtable deviations from the menu of rental contracts deﬁned above are possible.
For instance, learning the current quality of the car from its previous consumer is beneﬁcial
to a ﬁrm for two reasons: (i) one or more steps in the trickle-down mechanism may be bypassed,
and (ii) the next consumer will not need to experiment in order to ﬁnd the right quality for her;
therefore, she will be willing to pay a higher per-period rental price to the deviating ﬁrm. However,
if the time between periods is small, the gain from such deviations is also small: if ∆ is small, (i)
allocating a car via the trickle-down mechanism only imposes a short delay, and (ii) the cost of
experimentation is small.
29These intuitive observations can be formalized and developed in two directions. In the setting
of Section 3.4, it is possible to adapt the proof of Theorem 3 to establish the following approximate
equilibrium result.
Theorem 5 For every ε > 0, there exists ∆ε > 0 such that, for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆ε), the following
constitutes a market ε-equilibrium:
(i) ﬁrms produce the ﬁrst-best output, and oﬀer N +1 vintage-dependent rental contracts at the
instantaneous rental prices r0,...,rN determined by equation (23);
(ii) for every n = 0,...,N, consumer types θ ∈ [θn,θn−1] rent vintage-n cars and only keep
cars of quality qn, where the cutoﬀs θ0,...,θN are determined by equation (18).
Furthermore, as ∆ → 0, for every n = 0,...,N, θn → θ∗
n and rn → r∗
n.
The proof of Theorem 5 can be found in the Appendix; here we provide a brief sketch. As
explained in Section 3.4, each deviation can be shown to be dominated by a menu of one-period
rental contracts; the argument is independent of the speciﬁc features of the depreciation process.
Prices in the dominating menu of rental contracts are set so as to ensure that each target consumer
is indiﬀerent between renting a car from the deviating ﬁrm, then reverting to experimentation with
her designated vintage, and experimenting with that vintage forever.
As suggested by the above intuitive discussion, under general depreciation, the rental prices
charged in each period by the deviating ﬁrm for a car of quality qn can be larger than 1−e−ρ∆
ρ rn,
because the latter is determined taking into account the cost of experimentation borne by con-
sumers. We also noted above that the gain from such a one-period deviation is “small” if ∆ is not
too large; however, we must quantify gains from deviations per unit of calendar time, because as
∆ becomes smaller, the expected number of periods until the car dies grows larger. We thus show
that gains per time unit vanish as ∆ → 0, which completes the proof.
Theorem 5 may be interpreted as stating that, if ∆ is small, then there is an approximate
equilibrium wherein all ﬁrms oﬀer the rental contracts described in Section 4.2. The previous
version of this paper (Hendel, Lizzeri and Siniscalchi, 2002) considered a model characterized by
initial uncertainty about quality, no depreciation, and a positive probability that the car dies in
each period; these assumptions correspond to γn,m = 0 for m = n + 1,...,N and γn,N+1 > 0.
In this environment, we established a complementary result: when ∆ is small, there is an exact
equilibrium wherein almost all ﬁrms oﬀer the rental contracts described above, but a small mass
of ﬁrms oﬀer other types of contracts.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst showed that producers may proﬁtably deviate from the menu of rental
contracts by oﬀering a leasing contract, so that the consumer pays a rental price for experimenting
with the good and a keeping price to purchase the good if it is of the right quality. In particular,
a proﬁtable deviation consists of a contract tailored to a marginal type θn, who is just indiﬀerent
between experimenting with vintages n and n+1 under the rental contracts described above. Prices
in the deviating contract are chosen so as to induce this consumer to keep both qualities qn and
qn+1. This accelerates experimentation: if the quality of the car is qn+2 or worse, the ﬁrm learns
this exactly one period earlier.
We then construct an equilibrium in the class of leasing contracts, wherein a (small) fraction
of ﬁrms oﬀer “accelerating” contracts of this kind, and all other ﬁrms oﬀer rental contracts as
30described in the preceding section. Since a positive mass of “accelerating” contracts is oﬀered,
misallocations occur with positive probability and tend to reduce revenues from these contracts;
indeed, in equilibrium, the costs resulting from misallocation exactly oﬀsets the beneﬁts from
accelerated experimentation, so that ﬁrms are just indiﬀerent between the two types of contracts.
But this implies that, as ∆ → 0, the fraction of ﬁrms oﬀering rental contracts converges to 1, so
that the equilibrium allocation converges to the eﬃcient allocation. Intuitively, as the time between
transactions becomes negligible, so do beneﬁts from accelerated experimentation; in equilibrium,
these equal the cost of misallocation, so the equilibrium allocation must be asymptotically eﬃcient.
5 Conclusions
We presented a model of adverse selection durable goods market in which (approximately) eﬃcient
sorting can be obtained through smoothly functioning secondary markets. We ﬁrst discussed a
simple depreciation model, in which the quality of new goods is known, but goods may depreciate
by one quality level with positive probability in each period; thus, there is asymmetric information
in secondary markets. We showed that resale markets do not lead to eﬃcient allocations, but menus
of rental contracts replicate the observable-quality outcome. We also showed that competitive ﬁrms
have the incentive to provide the eﬃcient amount of output via the menu of rental contracts that
implements the eﬃcient allocation. We then considered a generalization of the simple model in
which initial quality is uncertain and depreciation by more than one step can occur in a given period.
For the second model, the observable quality allocation cannot be achieved by any mechanism.
However, we showed that rental contracts lead to approximate eﬃciency if retrading is frequent.
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the consumer learns the quality of a unit as soon
as she uses it for the ﬁrst time. This leads to rather strong eﬃciency results. If instead one were
to assume that the quality discovery process may take a minimal amount of time, and that such
learning may be imperfect, then new eﬀects would arise out of the interaction between asymmetric
information and slow learning. In particular, we conjecture that in such a model, a consumer may
get rid of a high quality unit incorrectly believing it to be low quality. Once the high quality good
is in the hands of a low valuation consumer, it may becomes impossible to get it back in the hands
of high valuation consumers. Thus, some degree of misallocation may be inescapable.
It would be interesting to extend the model to study matching under asymmetric information
in the labor market, so as to understand the relation between job mobility and wage growth. To
this end, two additional key features should be incorporated in the model. First, both sides in the
labor market can take actions after learning the quality of a match: both employers and workers
can in principle choose to dissolve a match, whereas in our model the car cannot decide to get rid
of the consumer. Second, idyosincratic components are likely to be a more important feature of
match quality in labor markets than in markets for durable goods.
Finally, it may be instructive to contrast our results with those from the literature on the Coase
conjecture. This literature deals with a monopolistic producer of a durable good of known quality.
In that setting, a monopolist may prefer a rental contract over a sale contract, because the former
avoids the commitment problem.20 In the context of a durable-goods monopoly, if consumers
20See Bulow (1982) for this argument.
31are patient, the stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome under selling is approximately
eﬃcient.21 In contrast, under rental, the equilibium outcome involves the monopolist producing
too little output. Thus, the consequences for eﬃciency of these alternative contractual arrangements
are the opposite of those we ﬁnd in our model.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
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Next, since γn,n(∆) = 1 − Gn∆,
10An−1,nvn−1 =
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In particular, since vintage-N cars can only have quality qN, 10vN = vN
N and GN = γN,N+1 and
therefore also γN,N(∆) = 1 − γN,N+1∆. Hence
γN,N+1∆vN = 10vN − γN,N(∆)vN















k = 10v0 − γ0,0(∆)v0
0 = y.
This shows that, if the quantities vn
m are deﬁned via equation (15), they automatically satisfy






m = 0 if y = 0.
Hence, as long as χ0 > 0, there exists y∗ such that equation (17), too, is satisﬁed.
To prove the second part of the claim, note ﬁrst that all quantities vn
m are bounded, so y → 0
as ∆ → 0. This immediately implies that v0
m → 0 for m > 0; proceeding by induction, assume
that we have shown vn−1
m → 0 for m > n − 1: then the last line of equation (15) implies that
vn
m → 0 as well for m > n (in particular, the terms in the summation corresponding to ` = n − 1
vanish because vn−1


























  → 0 as ∆ → 0.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
A preliminary result is needed for this and other proofs.
Lemma 4 For all n = 0,...,N, liminf∆→0 λn
n > 0.
Proof. By equation (19), the claim is clearly true for n = 0. For n > 0, note ﬁrst that the
denominator of λn





























































Now Lemma 1 shows that vn−1
n−1 → v∗



















k = Y < 1;
33since v0
m = χmy for m > 0, this immediately implies that the claim is true for n = 0. Assuming












and the induction hypothesis implies that sup∆>0
vn−1
m
∆ < ∞; since γm,m(∆) → 1, the claim is true
for n as well.

































and the claim follows.
Turn now to the proof of Lemma 2. Note that, for M = {n}, the functions V n
{n} can be rewritten
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Therefore, we can write
V n
{n}(θ,∅) = (1 − wn)























1 − e−ρ∆(1 − Gn∆) + e−ρ∆λn
n(1 − Gn∆)
.
By Lemma 4, liminf∆→0 λn
n ≡ Λn > 0, so
wn ≥
e−ρ∆Λn(1 − Gn∆)





i.e. wn → 1. Now consider rental prices. Clearly, rN = r∗
N; thus, assume that rn+1 → r∗
n+1 for
n < N; then V n
{n}(θn,∅) = V n+1
{n+1}(θn,∅) iﬀ
rn = rn+1 +





n+1 + (qn − qn+1)θ∗
n = r∗
n,
because wn → 1 and θn → θ∗
n.
356.3 Supply Side under Simple and General Depreciation
The proofs of Theorems 3 and 5 are very similar, except that an additional step is required for the
latter. It is thus convenient to present them together.
We begin by describing the realizations of the quality process, or quality histories. Recall that a
car of quality qn that depreciates becomes a car of quality qm with probability γn,m∆. Also, when
a car of quality qN depreciates, it disappears (“dies”). Thus, we are led to consider quality histories
of the form (q0,...,q0,q1,...,q1,q2,...,qn,...,qN,...,qN,0), where 0 denotes that the car has died.
Formally, let Q be the set of all ﬁnite sequences {q0,...,qJ} such that (i) if q0 = qn, then χn > 0,
and (ii) qj ≥ qj+1 for all j = 0,...,J − 1; also, let ¯ Q the set of all complete quality histories: that
is, (q0,...,qJ) ∈ ¯ Q iﬀ (q0,...,qJ) ∈ Q and qJ = 0.
Let Q denote the set of all qualities: that is, Q = {q0,...,qN,0}; then, for all integers m, Qm
denotes the Cartesian product of m copies of Q (in particular, Q0 = ∅).
Recall that depreciation events occur at the end of the period. Therefore, the history (q0,...,qJ)
should be interpreted as follows: q0 is the initial quality of the car; then, for j > 0, qj is the quality
of the car in period j, which is determined by the realization of the depreciation process at the end
of period j − 1.
We now describe deviations from the putative equilibrium rental contracts. A deviation consists
of a collection of mechanisms, each targeted to a speciﬁc type of consumer. We begin by analyzing
single mechanisms.
It turns out that, in order to assess whether a deviation is proﬁtable, only certain elements
of a mechanism need to be explicitly described. In particular, below we derive upper bounds on
the revenues of a deviating ﬁrm. These bounds are determined solely by individual rationality
considerations, taking into account the fact that equilibrium contracts oﬀered by other ﬁrms are
always available to consumers. Therefore, we only need a representation of a mechanism that allows
us to compute consumers’ utility and payment ﬂows.
Moreover, it is technically convenient to analyze a larger set of deviations than would be feasible
for a ﬁrm operating in the environment described in the main text; in particular, we assume that
(i) the deviating ﬁrm knows the initial quality of its newly-produced car, and (ii) the ﬁrm can
ascertain the type of any consumer it transacts with. Since the ﬁrm can commit to the contracts
it oﬀers, having access to such information can only have a positive eﬀect on revenues; therefore,
our upper bound will be valid a fortiori when all informational constraints are taken into account.
We ﬁrst specify under what circumstances a car may be oﬀered via the mechanism; we do so by
indicating a set of initial quality histories. The interpretation is that the consumer who enters the
mechanism does not necessarily know the previous history of the car, but knows that it belongs to
the speciﬁed initial set. It is up to the deviating ﬁrm to decide how much to reveal to consumers.
Second, we must be able to establish when the car exits the mechanism—either because it dies,
or because it is returned to the ﬁrm. A speciﬁc mechanism will prescribe that certain actions
be taken (e.g. the consumer is supposed to keep the car for 3 periods, then return it if the car
has depreciated at least once, and otherwise keep it for 2 more periods). These prescriptions and
actions determine a set of ﬁnal quality histories; our minimalistic description of a deviation only
requires the speciﬁcation of the latter.
36Third, we deﬁne revenues. Again, a speciﬁc mechanism will prescribe that certain transfers be
eﬀected, possibly contingent on the actions taken by the consumer (e.g. the consumer pays a price
p upon entering the mechanism; then, if she keeps the car for more than 3 periods, she pays a rental
price r for each additional period.) And, again, such speciﬁcs are irrelevant for our purposes; we
only deﬁne a revenue function that indicates, for every continuation history that is consistent with
some initial history and leads to a ﬁnal history, the transfer eﬀected by the consumer to the ﬁrm.
Finally, we specify a set of target consumer types that are allowed to enter the mechanism.
We need not describe the speciﬁcs of the mechanism that result in only certain types entering the
mechanism; as noted above, for the purposes of the present analysis, we simply assume that ﬁrms
can decide whether or not to transact with her.
Deﬁnition 1 A (reduced-form) mechanism is a tuple M = (I,F,R,Θ), where:
• I,F ⊂ Q and both sets are nonempty.
• If (q0,...,qJ) ∈ F, then there exists j0 < J such that (q0,...,qj0) ∈ I;
• If (q0,...,qj0) ∈ I, then there exist J > j0 and {qj0+1,...,qJ} ∈ QJ−(j0+1) such that
(q0,...,qj0,qj0+1,...,qJ) ∈ F;
• If (q0,...,qj0) ∈ I, then there does not exist j1 > 0 and {qj0+1,...,qj1} ∈ Qj1−(j0+1) such that
(q0,...,qj0,qj0+1,...,qj1) ∈ I.
Now deﬁne the set of continuation histories
H =

(qj0,...,qJ) ∈ QJ−j0+1 : (q0,...,qj0,qj0+1,...,qJ) ∈ F for some (q0,...,qj0) ∈ I
	
• If (qj0,...,qJ) ∈ H, then there is no {qJ+1,...,qK} ∈ QK−J such that (qj0,...,qJ,qJ+1,...,qK) ∈
H.
• R : H → R
• Θ ⊂ [θ,θ].
Suppose that, in period j0, a consumer enters the mechanism and receives a car characterized
by the initial quality history (q0,...,qj0) ∈ I. The consumer does not observe the entire history;
however, as soon as she receives the car, she learns qj0. She then keeps the car until its realized
partial history is one of the elements of the set F—say, (q0,...,qj0,qj0+1,...,qJ). The consumer then
returns the car at the end of period J, and her total payments to the ﬁrm from period j0 through
time J are given by eρ∆(J−j0)R(qj0,...,qJ).22 That is, R(qj0,...,qJ) is the discounted value of the
transfer at the beginning of period j0.
22If (q
j0,...,q
J) is a feasible intermediate partial history, then in particular q
j0 is one of the possible initial qualities
of the car, i.e. (q
0,...,q
j0) ∈ I. In other words, the very ﬁrst observation the consumer makes is the initial quality of
the car (which was realized in period j0 − 1).
Also note that, as a consequence of the deﬁnition, intermediate partial histories have length at least 2: they contain
the initial quality of the car, and the quality resulting from the realization of the depreciation process at the end of
the ﬁrst period of the mechanism. Thus, initial histories can never be complete histories.
37The last restriction on initial histories rules out the possibility that both a history and one of
its subhistories be elements of I. For instance, the set {(0,0),(0,0,1)} violates this restriction. The
intuition is that, if (0,0) is an initial history, then the consumer enters the mechanism in period 2,
so (0,0,1) could not also be an initial history.
The restriction on continuation histories is a deﬁniteness requirement: the consumer must be
able to tell whether a ﬁnal history has obtained based on what she observes. If (qj0,...,qJ) and
(qj0,...,qJ,qJ+1,...,qK) were both possible continuation histories, the consumer would not be able
to decide whether or not to exit in period J. Thus, we eliminate this possibility.
For example, under simple depreciation, the equilibrium mechanism for vintage-1 cars is deﬁned
as follows: I consists of all partial histories (q0,...,qj0) such that qj0 = q1 and qj = q0 for all j < j0;
F contains all histories (q0,...,qJ) such that qJ = q2 and qj > q2 for j < J; H is a set containing





ρ r1e−ρ∆(j−j0) = 1−e−ρ∆[(J−1)−j0]
ρ r∗
1.
We emphasize that this is not a complete description of a mechanism and/or of the consumer’s
optimizing behavior conditional upon entering the mechanism; it is merely a reduced-form repre-
sentation of those elements that are essential to the analysis.
The initial quality distribution (qn,χn : n = 0,...,N +1) and depreciation probabilities γn,m∆
determine a probability distribution Pr[·] over the set of complete histories ¯ Q. Certain derived
probabilities will now be obtained. First, for any partial history (q0,...,qj),
Pr[(q0,...,qj)] = Pr[{(¯ q0,..., ¯ qJ) ∈ ¯ Q : ∀j0 = 0,...,j, ¯ qj0
= qj0
}].





Finally, ﬁx a mechanism M = (I,F,R,Θ). We are interested in the conditional probability of
reaching a mechanism by way of a speciﬁc initial history (q0,...,qj0) ∈ I, given that the mechanism
is reached in period j0. Assuming throughout there are histories of such length in I, this probability
can be computed as follows:
Pr[(q0,...,qj0)|I,j0] =
Pr[(q0,...,qj0)]
Pr[{(ˆ q0,..., ˆ qj0) ∈ I}]
A collection of mechanisms that constitute a deviation must be internally consistent. To mo-
tivate, consider the following two mechanisms: M0 is such that I0 = {(q0)}, and the consumer is
supposed to keep the car for exactly 3 periods, then return it to the ﬁrm regardless of the realization
of the depreciation process; M1 is such that I1 = {(q0,q1,q2)}, and the consumer keeps the car
until it dies. The pair (M0,M1) is not a well-deﬁned deviation, because it does not specify what
to do if the car does not depreciate each period. This motivates the following deﬁnition.
38Deﬁnition 2 A menu is a collection M of (reduced-form) mechanisms such that, for every partial
history (q0,...,qJ), there is a unique mechanism M = (I,F,R,Θ) ∈ M and period j0 ≤ J such
that
1. (q0,...,qj0) ∈ I;
2. for some J0 > J and (qJ+1,...,qJ0
) ∈ QJ0−(J+1), (q0,...,qJ,qJ+1,...,qJ0
) ∈ F.
That is: at any point in the course of the car’s quality history, it is always clear which mechanism
must be used (or is being used). As noted above, we allow for menus that distinguish between
diﬀerent initial qualities of the deviator’s car (more precisely, between histories that diﬀer in their
period-zero component, which corresponds to the initial quality of a new car).
Throughout the remainder of this proof, let V e(θ) denote the expected payoﬀ to type θ if she
uses the putative equilibrium rental contracts and follows the appropriate policy for her; under
simple depreciation, for θ ∈ [θ∗
n,θ∗
n−1], V e(θ) =
qnθ−r∗
n
ρ ; under general depreciation, θ ∈ [θn,θn−1],
V e(θ) = Vn,{n}(θ,∅). For the sake of notational uniformity, we denote cutoﬀ types for the simple
depreciation model by θn, etc, suppressing stars.
Suppose that the deviating ﬁrm oﬀers a menu M, and consider an arbitrary mechanism M =











Suppose that a consumer θ ∈ [θn,θn−1] is targeted by mechanism M, so θ ∈ Θ. Individual rational-
ity then determines an upper bound on her willingness to pay for M in period j0. Speciﬁcally, let
V (θ) denote the value from type θ’s best strategy not involving participation in M when she does
not have a car; note that this strategy may prescribe participating (at a later date) in some other
mechanism oﬀered by the deviator—i.e. it is not necessarily conﬁned to the putative equilibrium
rental contracts. Hence, in general, V (θ) ≥ V e(θ). In any case, in period j0, type θ only accepts to
participate in the mechanism M if her expected payment does not exceed the diﬀerence between
(i) the consumption value of entering M in period j0, then following her best continuation policy
when the mechanism terminates, and (ii) the value of adopting her best continuation policy at j0.
39This determines the following upper bound on expected revenues from type θ to the deviator:

































qkθ − (1 − e−ρ∆j)V (θ)

. (26)
We now construct a new menu M0 that still satisﬁes each target consumer’s individual ratio-
nality constraint, and yields at least as much revenues as M to the deviating ﬁrm. The new menu
consists of one-period “rental” contracts, targeted to a single consumer type, wherein the ﬁrm fully
discloses the history of the car up to the current period; each mechanism in the original menu is
replaced by a collection of such one-period rental contracts, and payments are deﬁned so as to leave
the target consumer indiﬀerent between taking up the contract (for one period), then reverting to
her designated putative equilibrium rental contract, and choosing the latter right away. This im-
plies that any policy involving her designated putative equilibrium contract, as well as any contract
made available to her by the deviator, yields exactly the same expected payoﬀ, so the new menu
consists of individually rational mechanisms.
Formally, consider an arbitrary M = (I,F,R,Θ) ∈ M; for every θ ∈ Θ and partial history
(q0,...,qj0,...,qj) such that (i) (q0,...,qj0) ∈ I and (ii) for some (qj+1,...,qJ) ∈ QJ−(j+1),
(q0,...,qj,...,qJ) ∈ F, deﬁne a mechanism M(θ,q0,...,qj) with (q0,...,qj) as unique unique
initial history,
{(q0,...,qj,qj+1) : Pr[(q0,...,qj,qj+1)|(q0,...,qj)] > 0}




qjθ − (1 − e−ρ∆)V e(θ) (27)
as revenue function. It is clear that the collection of mechanisms thus obtained is a menu; note
that, in particular, this menu prescribes diﬀerent contracts for a newly produced car, depending on
its initial quality.
To verify individual rationality, observe that, by construction, if a consumer of type θ enters
the mechanism M(θ,q0,...,qj0) [which can happen only in period j0, following the partial history
(q0,...,qj0) of the car oﬀered by the deviator], her per-period payoﬀ is (1−e−ρ∆)V e(θ). Hence, her
per-period payoﬀ from any mechanism oﬀered by the deviator is the same, and of course it coincides
with the expected per-period payoﬀ from her designated putative equilibrium rental contracts.
40We now verify that the deviator does not lose by oﬀering the menu M0 in lieu of M. Consider
any mechanism M = (I,F,R,Θ) ∈ M, any initial history (q0,...,qj0) ∈ I, any ﬁnal history




























qkθ − (1 − e−ρ∆(j−j0))V e(θ)
Notice that this quantity appears in the last line of equation (26); hence, taking conditional ex-
pectations over all histories (q0,...,qj0,qj0+1,...,qj) ∈ F consistent with (q0,...,qj0), and then
over all (q0,...,qj0) ∈ I, yields precisely the upper bound ¯ RM,j0(θ) on revenues accruing to the
deviating ﬁrm from mechanism M if it transacts with type θ beginning in period j0. Since this is
true for all target types and all mechanisms, the new menu M0 yields at least as much revenues as
the initial one.
Recall that, in the case of simple depreciation, for θ ∈ [θn,θn−1], V e(θ) =
qnθ−rn
ρ . In the





ρ ; write this as
˜ qnθ−rn
ρ , where
˜ qn = (1 − wn)En(q|q ≤ qn) + wnqn, n = 0,...,N.
It is then possible to rewrite equation (23), which determines the putative equilibrium rental prices
r0,...,rN, as follows: ˜ qNθN − rN = 0, ˜ qnθn − rn = ˜ qn+1θn − rn+1 for n = 0,...,N − 1. Notice
that this is analogous to equation (6), except that the “experimentation-corrected” quantities ˜ qn
are used in lieu of the actual ones (note however that ˜ qN = qN). In other words, the simple
depreciation case corresponds to setting wn = 1 independently of ∆.
For n < N, rn = rn+1 + θn(˜ qn − ˜ qn+1), and hence
rn = ˜ qNθN +
N−1 X
m=n
θm(˜ qm − ˜ qm+1). (28)




qjθ − (1 − e−ρ∆)






(qj − ˜ qn)θ + rn

.




[(˜ q` − ˜ qn)θ + rn] +
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ
(q` − ˜ q`)θ.
We claim ﬁrst that (˜ q` − ˜ qn)θ + rn ≤ r`. Suppose ﬁrst that ` ≤ n: from equation (28),
r` − rn =
n−1 X
m=`
θm(˜ qm − ˜ qm+1) ≥ θ
n−1 X
m=`
(˜ qm − ˜ qm+1) = (˜ q` − ˜ qn)θ,
because, for m = `,...,n − 1, θm ≥ θn−1 ≥ θ ∈ [θn,θn−1]. If instead ` > n,
rn − r` =
`−1 X
m=n
θm(˜ qm − ˜ qm+1) ≤ θ
`−1 X
m=n
(˜ qm − ˜ qm+1) = (˜ qn − ˜ q`)θ,













(q` − ˜ q`)¯ θ.
Therefore, the menu M0 (hence, the original menu M) cannot improve upon the menu consisting
of the putative equilibrium rental contracts by more than 1−e−ρ∆
ρ maxn(qn−˜ qn)¯ θ per period. Under
simple depreciation, ˜ qn = qn for all n, which concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
To complete the proof of Theorem 5, note that the gains from deviating from the putative
equilibrium rental contracts cannot exceed the maximum per-period gain times the expected lifetime
of the car (i.e. the expected number of periods until the car dies). For every n = 0,...,N, the
numer of periods until a car of quality qn depreciates is a geometric random variable with parameter
Gn∆, so the expected number of periods until depreciation is 1
Gn∆ (recall that a car depreciates
at the end of the period, so if depreciation occurs in the ﬁrst time period, this means that the car
has remained at quality level qn for one period). We can then argue inductively as follows. Let Ln
be the expected lifetime (in periods) of a car of quality qn, where n = N + 1 signiﬁes death. Then










Thus, if the deviating ﬁrm has a car of quality qn, she cannot improve upon the putative equilibrium
menu by more than 1−e−ρ∆
ρ max`(q` − ˜ q`)¯ θ · Ln, where again we let n = N + 1 signify that the car
has already died. We argue that, for all n, 1−e−ρ∆
ρ max`(q` − ˜ q`)¯ θ · Ln → 0 as ∆ → 0. This is



















































(q` − ˜ q`)¯ θ = 0,
because ˜ q` → q` for all ` as ∆ → 0. This proves Theorem 5.
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44WebAppendix
NOTE: This section contains material we will make available for download from our Web pages;
it is not part of the actual paper. We construct equilibria under selling with both observable and
unobservable vintages (see Section 3.5.6 in the paper).
Equilibrium Under Selling with Unobservable Vintages
There are only “new” and “old” cars; prices are pn and pu. Types θ ∈ [θ0,¯ θ] buy new cars and
keep only quality q0 (i.e. sell as soon as car depreciates). Types θ ∈ [θ01,θ0] buy new cars and keep
qualities q0 and q1. Types θ ∈ [θ1,θ01] buy used cars, keep q1, and sell q2. It is convenient to denote
masses of buyers as follows: v0 = 1 − F(θ0) is the mass of new car buyers who only keep q0; v01,0
(resp. v01,1) is the mass of new car buyers who keep q0 and q1 and, in any given period (in steady
state), happpen to own a quality-q0 (resp. q1); it must be the case that v01,0+v01,1 = F(θ01)−F(θ0).
Furthermore, let v1,1 be the mass of types who buy used and happen to own a quality-q1 car; ﬁnally,
v1,2 is the mass of buyers who buy used and happen to own a quality-q2; it must be the case that
v1,1 + v1,2 = F(θ01) − F(θ1) and 1 − F(θ1) = Y .
Now let ϕ denote the fraction of new cars that are bought by types who then only keep quality
q0. We have
v0 = (1 − γ0∆)v0 + v1,2γ2∆ϕ
v01,0 = (1 − γ0∆)v01,0 + v1,2γ2∆(1 − ϕ)
v01,1 = (1 − γ1∆)v01,1 + γ0∆v01,0
v1,1 = (1 − γ1∆)v1,1 + γ0∆v0
v1,2 = (1 − γ2∆)v1,2 + γ1∆(v01,1 + v1,1).
To clarify: in steady state, the total mass of types θ who buy new and keep q0 equals the mass of
such individuals whose car did not die in the previous period , plus the mass of such individuals
whose cars died in the previous period and was replaced by a new car; in particular, the steady-
state ﬂow of replacement cars equals the mass of cars that were in the hands of buyers who buy
used, happened to hold a car of quality q2, and whose car died. An identical interpretation holds
for v01,0. The interpretation of v01,1 is similar, but now the interpretation of the second term is
diﬀerent: the inﬂow of buyers into this category equals the mass of buyers who are also buying
new and keeping q0 and q1, who had a car of quality q0 in the previous period, which however
depreciated. For v1,1, the second term represents the mass of cars held by consumers who buy new
and keep only q0 (these are the only used cars that enter the market at quality level q1). Finally,
for v1,2, the second term has an analogous interpretation; the ﬁrst is more noteworthy. Recall that,
in the equilibrium we are trying to construct, cars of quality q2 that do not depreciate (hence, die)
are immediately sold; however, until they depreciate, they remain part of the pool of used cars.
Hence the ﬁrst term.
Rearranging terms and noting that (v0 + v01,0)γ0∆ = (v01,1 + v1,1)γ1∆ = v1,2γ2∆ and (v0 +
1v01,0) + (v01,1 + v1) + v1,2 = Y , we get v1,2γ2(γ−1
0 + γ−1
1 + γ−1
2 ) = Y and therefore
























Finally, taking into account the way each quality is split among each group,
v0 = λ0Y ϕ
v01,0 = λ0Y (1 − ϕ)
v01,1 = λ1Y (1 − ϕ)
v1,1 = λ1Y ϕ
v1,2 = λ2Y.
Note that these quantities are independent of ∆. Moreover, the fraction of quality-q0 cars owned














1 (1−ϕ) ≡ λn
0, and the fraction of quality-q1 cars in the used market
is
λ1ϕ
λ1ϕ+λ2 = ϕ1. All these quantities are also independent of ∆.
Turn now to the value functions. Consider buyers who participate in the used-car market.
Recall they must keep q1 and sell q2 immediately (because there are some quality-q1 cars in the
used-car market, and the price they get for their car equals the price they pay for another used
car). We must determine the fraction of quality-q1 cars that are supplied in every period. Types
θ ∈ [θ0,¯ θ] sell quality-q1 cars, so the fresh supply of this quality equals v0γ0∆ = λ0Y ϕγ0∆; on the
other hand, the v01,1 types θ ∈ [θ01,θ0] who held a quality-q1 car in the previous period, which
then depreciated, sell a mass v01,1γ1∆ = λ1Y (1 − ϕ)γ1∆ of quality-q2, cars. Furthermore, the v1,2
types θ ∈ [θ1,θ01] who had a bad draw in the previous period, as well as the v1,1 types in the same
interval who had a quality-q1 car in the previous period, which then depreciated, are also reselling
their cars on the used market. This adds v1,1γ1∆+v1,2(1−γ2∆) = λ1Y ϕγ1∆+λ2Y (1−γ2∆) cars
(note that we must make sure that the cars oﬀered do not die). Hence, the fraction of quality-q1
used cars oﬀered each period in vintage 1 is
λ0Y ϕγ0∆
λ0Y ϕγ0∆ + λ1Y (1 − ϕ)γ1∆ + λ1Y ϕγ1∆ + λ2Y (1 − γ2∆)
=
λ0ϕγ0∆





2using the fact that λ1γ1 = λ2γ2. Observe that ϕu does depend upon ∆. Note that the fraction of
quality-q1 used cars of at any point in time, ϕ1, will in general be diﬀerent from ϕu, because cars
of quality q2 accumulate in the used-car market. Hence
















q1θ + e−ρ∆ {(1 − γ1∆)Wu,1(θ) + γ1∆[pu + Vu(θ)]}.
To clarify: if the used car is q1, then buyers enjoy it for one period; then, if it does not depreciate,
they get the continuation value Wu,1(θ) determined by the assumption that the car is sold as soon
as it depreciates. If the used car is q2, it is sold immediately, but one must take into account the
fact that the car may still die (hence the buyer may be unable to resell it).
Next, consider θ ∈ [θ01,θ0]. These buyers buy a new car, and sell it when it depreciates to q2.
We must still keep track of the continuation values; however, now a new car is guaranteed to be of
quality q0.
Vn,01(θ) = −pn +
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ








q0θ + e−ρ∆ {(1 − γ0∆)Wn,01,0(θ) + γ0∆Wn,01,1(θ)}.
Finally, we consider buyers who buy new cars and keep q0.
Vn,0(θ) = −pn +
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ
q0θ + e−ρ∆ {(1 − γ0∆)Wn,0(θ) + γ0∆[pu + Vn,0(θ)}
Wn,0(θ) = Vn,0(θ) + pn.
To construct an equilibrium, consider an arbitrary ϕ ∈ [0,1]: ϕ = 1 cannot yield an equilibrium,
because it would induce an eﬃcient allocation, which, by Theorems 1 and 1, is impossible. For
each such ϕ, it is possible to choose prices pu and pn such that
Vu(θ1) = 0, Vn,01(θ01) = Vu(θ01).
We now consider three cases. (1) If Vn,0(θ0) < Vn,01(θ0) for all ϕ (recall that ϕ determines the
cutoﬀ θ0), then in particular this is true for ϕ = 0, where θ0 = ¯ θ; this implies that, for ϕ = 0,
Vn,0(θ) < Vn,01(θ) for all θ (the argument requires a decomposition analogous to the one in the
proof of Lemma 2). Hence ϕ = 0 yields the right incentives to all consumers types when they do
not own a car.
3(2) If Vn,0(θ0) > Vn,01(θ0) for all values of ϕ, then in particular this is the case at ϕ = 1, where
θ0 = θ01; for this value of ϕ, it is then the case that Vn,0(θ0) > Vn,01(θ0) = Vu(θ0). Hence there
exists a price p0
n > pn such that Vn,0(θ0) = Vu(θ0) > Vn,01(θ0); that is, at the prices p0
n,pu, all types
θ ∈ [θ0 = θ01,¯ θ] buy new cars and keep only q0, and types θ ∈ [θ1,θ0] buy used cars.
(3) If, ﬁnally, there exist ϕ,ϕ0 such that at the corresponding prices and cutoﬀ types θ0, θ0
0,
Vn,0(θ0) < Vn,01(θ0) and Vn,0(θ0
0) > Vn,01(θ0
0), then by continuity there exists ϕ00 such that equality
obtains.
Thus, in all thee cases, for an appropriate choice of prices and ϕ ∈ [0,1], consumers follow the
policies described above when they do not own a car; to complete the argument, we now show that
they also do so when they already own a car (i.e. they adopt the “right” keeping policies).
The argument for consumers who experiment with used cars is straightforward: if they currently
own quality q1 (resp. q2) given that their best continuation policy is to buy another used car, they
can only do worse (resp. better) in expectation by selling their current car. Thus, turn to type θ01,
assuming that ϕ < 1 (otherwise this case is irrelevant). It is clear that this type should not keep a








q1θ01 + e−ρ∆ {(1 − γ1∆)Wn,01,1(θ01) + γ1∆[pu + Vu(θ01)]} =
= Wu(θ01);
if she instead sells her car, then she can get at most pu +Vn,01(θ01) = pu +Vu(θ01) ≤ Wu(θ01). The
inequality follows because the l.h.s. is the value of receiving a used car, which may be of quality
q1 or q2, and following the optimal keeping policy for used cars, whereas the r.h.s. is the value
of receiving a car of quality q1, then following the same optimal keeping policy. Hence, type θ01
should keep a car of quality q1, and consequently she should also keep a car of quality q0. This
implies that all other types in [θ01,θ0] also have the correct incentives.
Finally, consider type θ0, assuming ϕ > 0 (otherwise this case is irrelevant). We must ensure
that this type will be willing to sell quality q1. If she does, she obtains
pu + Vn,0(θ). = pu + Vn,01(θ0) ≥ Wn,01,1(θ01),
where the inequality follows because pu +Vn,01(θ0) is the value of receiving a car of quality q0, and
keeping it until it depreciates to q2, then buying a new car and continuing with the same keeping
policy. Since Vn,0(θ01) = Vn,01(θ0), Wn,01,1(θ01) can equivalently be viewed as the value of keeping
a car of quality q1 until it depreciates, then reverting to the designated policy for type θ0. This
shows that keeping q1 is not a proﬁtable deviation for type θ0, and concludes the proof.
Equilibrium Under Selling with Observable Vintages
Notation is approximately as above. Now types in [θ0,¯ θ] buy new (i.e. vintage 0) cars and keep
only q0; their mass is v0. Types in [θ01,θ0] buy vintage 0 and keep q0 and q1; v01,0 is the mass of
such types who happen to own a quality-q0 car, and v01,1 is the mass of such types who own quality
4q1. Types in [θ1,θ01] buy vintage 1 and keep only q1; v1,1 and v1,2 denote the masses of such types
who own qualities q1 and q2 respectively. Finally, types in [θ2,θ1] buy vintage 2 and keep quality
q2; their mass is v2. We thus have, in steady state,
v0 = (1 − γ0)v0 + (v2 + v1,2)γ2∆ϕ
v01,0 = (1 − γ0∆)v01,0 + (v2 + v1,2)γ2∆(1 − ϕ)
v01,1 = (1 − γ1∆)v01,1 + v01,0γ0∆
v1,1 = (1 − γ1∆)v1,1 + v0γ0∆
v1,2 = v01,1γ1∆
v2 = (1 − γ2∆)v2 + v1,1γ1∆ + v1,2(1 − γ2∆).
To clarify, quality-q1 cars of vintage 1 are cars previously owned by types in [θ0,¯ θ] that have just
depreciated; quality-q2 cars of vintage 1 instead are cars that were discarded by types in [θ01,θ0].
The latter cars are immediately resold, and hence become of vintage 2, provided they do not die:
this explains the third term in the r.h.s. of the last equation. The remaining cars of vintage 2 are
either surviving vintage-2 cars or vintage-1 cars that have just depreciated from q1 to q2.
We solve as above. In particular, (v0 + v01,0)γ0∆ = (v2 + v1,2)γ2∆ and (v01,1 + v1,1)γ1∆ =
(v2 + v1,2)γ2∆, and we obtain v0 + v01,0 = λ0Y , v01,1 + v1,1 = λ1Y and v1,2 + v2 = λ2Y , with λi as
above. Therefore
v0 = λ0Y ϕ
v01,0 = λ0Y (1 − ϕ)
v01,1 = λ1Y (1 − ϕ)
v1,1 = λ1Y ϕ
v1,2 = λ1Y (1 − ϕ)γ1
v2 = λ2Y − λ2Y (1 − ϕ)γ2
(note that λiγi = λjγj for all i,j = 0,...2). The fraction of quality-q1 cars of vintage 1 is
ϕ1 =
ϕ
ϕ+(1−ϕ)γ1∆, and the fraction of quality-q0 cars in the hands of types θ ∈ [θ01,θ0] is ϕ0 = λ0
λ0+λ1.
Turn now to value functions and prices. For types θ ∈ [θ2,θ1],
V2(θ) = −p2 +
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ
q2θ + e−ρ∆{(1 − γ2∆)[V2(θ) + p2] + γ2∆V2(θ)}.
Next, consider θ ∈ [θ1,θ01]. We must distinguish between buyers who currently own a quality-
q1 car, and those who currently own q2 (and hence will immediately dispose of it). The key issue
here is the composition of the supply of vintage-1 cars: λ0Y ϕγ0∆ come from types θ ∈ [θ0,1], and
hence are of quality q1; λ1Y (1 − ϕ)γ1∆ come from types θ ∈ [θ01,θ0], and hence are of quality q2.
Therefore, the fraction of quality-q1 cars supplied is
λ0Y ϕγ0∆
λ0Y ϕγ0∆ + λ1Y (1 − ϕ)γ1∆
=
ϕ
ϕ + 1 − ϕ
= ϕ,
5where we use the fact that λ0γ0 = λ1γ1. Hence we can write















q1θ + e−ρ∆ {(1 − γ1∆)W1,1(θ) + γ1∆[V1(θ) + p2]}.
To clarify: consider a buyer who currently has no car. If she buys a vintage-1 car, with probability
ϕ she gets q1; W1,1(θ) represents her continuation payoﬀ, assuming the car does not depreciate
at the end of the period. With probability 1 − ϕ, she gets q2, in which case she sells the car
immediately, provided the car does not die at the end of the period; note that, in any case, the
buyer will purchase a vintage-1 car in the next period if her current car is of quality q2.
Now consider θ ∈ [θ01,θ0]. Recall that these buyers sell their cars only when it depreciates to
q2.
V01(θ) = −p0 +
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ








q0θ + e−ρ∆ [(1 − γ0∆)W01,0(θ) + γ0∆W01,1(θ)]
Note that the problem is exactly the same as the problem faced by consumers θ ∈ [θ01,θ0] in the
no-vintages case: simply let p0 = pn and p1 = pu.
Finally, V0(θ) is exactly like Vn,0 in the no-vintage case:
V0(θ) = −p0 +
1 − e−ρ∆
ρ
q0θ + e−ρ∆ {(1 − γ0∆)W0(θ) + γ0∆[p1 + V0(θ)}
W0(θ) = V0(θ) + p1.
To establish the existence of an equilibrium, we proceed as in the case of unobservable vintages.
For every value of ϕ ∈ [0,1], we can determine p0,p1,p2 via the indiﬀerence conditions
V2(θ2) = 0, V1(θ1) = V2(θ1), V01(θ01) = V1(θ01).
However, Theorems 1 and 1 imply that ϕ = 1 cannot correspond to an equilibrium, because it
implies eﬃciency. Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 1 shows that, at ϕ = 1, type θ01 = θ0 will
strictly prefer to keep quality q1 rather than resell her current car and buy another vintage-0 car.
This easily implies that, for ϕ = 1, V0(θ0) < V01(θ0). Hence, we only need to consider two cases:
if V0(θ0) > V01(θ0) for all ϕ, then ϕ = 0 yields the right incentives when consumers do not own a
car; otherwise, V0(θ0) = V01(θ0) for some ϕ ∈ [0,1).
Incentives when consumers already own a car are veriﬁed as in the case of unobservable vintages,
so the proof is omitted.
6